Richard D. Hall - Manchester On Trial (Manchester Arena Inquiry)

Video Transcript:

This film is a description of evidence which shows that the 2017 Manchester Arena incident was not what it was reported to be by official sources and inquiries. Operation Gladio, which was formally revealed in 1990 by Italian Prime Minister Andriotti and had already been exposed previously in the courts and elsewhere, involved NATO's participation in a series of terrorist atrocities throughout the 1950s to the 1980s. Elements within NATO and intelligence agencies were routinely using false flag terrorism to control and manipulate public opinion and shape policy. Therefore today everyone should be open-minded about all terrorist incidents to the possibility that they can and sometimes are set up by the very agencies that are supposed to prevent terrorism. The city room in the Manchester Arena where the blast occurred at 2231 is covered by three CCTV cameras. Two of the cameras have fixed positions and the third is movable into several set positions. The CCTV evidence that has been released by the public inquiry is far from comprehensive. The inquiry did not release continual footage from each camera leading up to the blast. They selected still images from particular cameras at selected times in order to help explain the narrative that they put forward. The movable cameras last position before the blast was probably as it is shown here because this is the last image from that camera to be released before the blast occurred, taken at 2228. The public inquiry did not produce a diagram showing the extent of the coverage from these three cameras. This oversight is revealing. Each camera has a blind spot immediately beneath it because the cameras are mounted quite high above the ground. The two fixed cameras are mounted on a pillar at position C at the top and the movable camera is mounted at position C at the bottom. The blue lines show the approximate visual range of each of the three cameras. The green area is the space which is not covered by a CCTV camera. This is blind space. Note that the merchandise stall is not covered by CCTV. This blind area was not discussed or highlighted at the public inquiry. According to the public inquiry Salmanabadi the terrorist perpetrator waited in the city room for about an hour prior to setting off his device. He is seen here entering the city room at 2133. He is alleged to have situated himself at the area at the top of the Mezzanine stairs and was unseen to CCTV cameras in this position because that area is obscured by a wall. The inquiry produced CCTV images showing that he went out of sight of cameras into position S at 2133. After this point he was not seen on CCTV again until 2230 immediately before the blast. The inquiry presented evidence showing that there were several witnesses who reported seeing Salmanabadi at or near position S during the hour before the blast. They were Muhammad Aga who saw him at 2133 and earlier. William Drysdale who saw him at about 2152 all the other witnesses saw him after 10 pm. The testimony of William Drysdale is important. Drysdale is captured on CCTV walking up the same steps at 2141 and 45 seconds towards a position close to where Abadi was thought to be. He is then seen at 2156 and 34 seconds coming back down the same steps. Drysdale positioned himself on the Mezzanine area at position D and was stood in that position from 2141 and 45 seconds until 2156 and 34 seconds. In this position Drysdale was only 8 meters away from Salmanabadi with a completely unobstructed view of him. Note also that Drysdale's job was to keep watch on members of the public to see if they were trying to sell unofficial merchandise so he was a professional observer. At the public inquiry, Nick De LaPore QC asks William Drysdale the following leading question. Now we know that you were sending that Mezzanine to shortly before or around 20 to 10 that night for the period that we're particularly concerned with. So you think that when you went up that those Mezzanine stairs you were immediately aware that he was there. It's like correction on that we were already on the Mezzanine and I remember coming back now, turned around and then I saw. So we've been up there 10 minutes or so. So you became, so you didn't know how long you've been there but you became aware that he was there at a point that you were already established in that position and we can see in that sense. And for how long did you look at him? So 90 seconds. Okay again I want to just clarify. Of course he, we and I. Oh sorry. Okay. No, no, you think we were all on the Mezzanine. You've been there for some time and you'd been there for 10 minutes before you saw him. Yeah. This dialogue shows that at 21, 41 and 45 seconds, Abadi was not seen at position S and Drysdale only became aware of him 10 minutes after he had claimed up the steps. This means that Abadi was not at position S at 21, 41, 45 and appeared at position S at around 21, 52. From this information there is a period of time from 21, 33 to 21, 52, which is 19 minutes when Abadi was not observed on CCTV or by any known eyewitness. Between 21, 42 and 22, 52, Drysdale did not see him at position S. Police radio communications have revealed that shortly after the explosion occurred a member of the public reported to the police that they had observed an Asian male parking a Grey Audi vehicle a few hundred meters from the arena then run off towards the arena with a rock sack on his back. The vehicle was parked outside land of furniture on Cheetam Hill Road shown in this aerial view. The time period when the Asian male was observed parking up shortly before the explosion is within the time period between 21, 30 and 22, 30. So it is therefore entirely possible that during the 19 minutes of time when Abadi was not seen that he had gone to pick up the Grey Audi vehicle possibly from the arena car park next to where he was situated then moved the car to Cheetam Hill Road to be used as a getaway vehicle. He may have then walked or ran as described by the witness back to his position in the city-room via the Trinity Way Tunnel arriving back at about 21, 52 to be witnessed by William Drysdale. The inquiry claimed that at 22, 31 Abadi walked into the center of the city-room and detonated his rock sack while still wearing it. The inquiry produced verbal eyewitness testimony to purport that a suicide occurred. However, other witness testimony completely contradicts that a suicide occurred. No photographs have been produced which prove that a suicide took place. Witness accounts suggest that at 22, 31 Abadi walked in a direction towards the far edge of the merchandise stall which is just out of the CCTV picture on the right-hand wall and dropped his rock sack next to the wall before running off away from the blast. These CCTV stills taken two seconds apart, sure Abadi walking with his rock sack shortly before the blast. He is walking in the direction towards the wall next to the merchandise stall in line with the arrow. He does not appear to be walking towards the center of the room as was claimed by the inquiry. The second source is from the BBC documentary The Night of the Bomb. Dale Olcock a column number 2032. There was a gentleman family man he was with his daughters. I asked him, I said, what's happened? And he said, there's a guy. I knew there was a new, I knew there was something wrong with him. He said he threw his bag and there was a large explosion and he ran off. I'm thinking, right, he's at large. Jade Juxbury was situated in the Sierra CCTV control room watching the CCTV screens immediately before the blast and claims to have noticed Sal Manabadi on the CCTV screen. She was asked. Did you see that he was wearing a heavy backpack at the time? Did that come to that? Is that something you can remember? No, I can't remember. It wasn't something that locked as it were when you saw it. No, no. An article from the Yorkshire Evening Post states that Mr Walker said the explosion was by the door in the foyer next to the merchandise stall. Based on these statements and the CCTV images, the diagram shows the approximate placement of the Rucksack at point X. According to the police's radio communications shortly after the blast and after a member of the public had alerted police to the Grey Audi with an Asian male driver with Rucksack, the police decided to put that abandoned Audi vehicle under observation. Six, six, nine, four. Reading the log, we've had a call from the public saying a short while ago, he saw an Asian male get out of the Grey Audi, get a Rucksack on his back and run off in a direction of the arena. He staked that vehicle when he called us, was still parked, obviously the old tell on the corner next to the any end arena. I'm on Cheedham Hill Road, which is just a few hundred yards from the Manchester arena and you can see behind me here is Imperial home. Now Imperial home used to be called Land of Furniture. So this is where I believe a Bady parked is get away vehicle. I suspect he picked it up round about nine thirty, moved it here outside of Land of Furniture then went back to the arena. So you shout out to somebody near that vehicle please. You're definitely want to send someone to it yeah. Actually, I'm saying 58, are you talking about the park in hotel but then the Cheedham Hill Road. We're not sure but that's the that's the only description he's given us. The VRM I've got for the vehicle is the Grey Alibi, Oxtrot bit to zero five Oscar per par, Oscar. Okay, I'm Cheedham Hill by the arena parking area. I'll have a look for that. Yeah, see. So how's he is Cheedham Hill Road next to Land of Furniture Park? You'll probably with it. I've got it under odds. I'm about thirty yards away from it. You need to shut traffic off. Coming down Cheedham Hill Road because anybody northbounder, let's can do it. Just confirm where it is again sorry. Confirm vehicles near Furniture Land in 58. So, Proxtrot Victor zero five Oscar per par, Oscar. Yeah, that's it. I flagged down the control. They stopped traffic coming into the city along Cheedham Hill Road but we still got traffic and pedestrian deading outbound. We need to create a sterile area around this vehicle because we don't know what's in it if anything. Roger. Just confirm it's near Furniture Land. Is the building next to Furniture Land is some sort of jewelry shop? I don't want to get any closer, mate. Any officers that can maybe assist stopping pedestrians and traffic going outbound through all this vehicle? Any officers that can maybe do that, please. Cheedham Hill Road stop pedestrians and traffic going outbound. Yeah, now I'm six, two, one. Just landed on scene now with one and seven. Do you have that more case? I can send a couple of the tolls up through it. If you can, please. We're out of service. We're out of service. It's called Furniture Land. The jewel is nearby. The vehicle, suspect vehicle is near that premises. Need to stop pedestrians and traffic going up Cheedham Hill Road. 1758. Send people to the Snookie Centre. Are we out of the network directly to Gordon everywhere? Tonight's the next three. What if you do that? Send people to the Snookie Centre, please. Yes, I got it. One, three, five, four. Just wind, forward. The taxi going to the yellow road. Find the where it managed to pedestrian the way from this vehicle. On three, five, four. Pick and jump. Three, five, four, three. Spoken traffic around the hotel on Cheedham Hill Road. What traffic coming out from the car park? Opportunity, wait. Do you want to be stopping people leaving the car park in the vehicles? The Renae car park, they're coming off. Yes, yes. People are still coming out the car park in our vehicles. And they're in it. Just see if they can see us. I hope the ones vehicles are raining and so too. That's about 15 to 15. 15 to 15. We managed to close off the bottom of Cheedham Hill Road, especially against the traffic and pedestrians where this vehicle has been abandoned. I'm conscious now there's a lot of people in the windows of the park hotel overlooking the vehicle. And in the car, in the hotel. Do you want me to speak to the management and get them moved to the windows and things as a precaution? Would be advisable, mate. Just in case we haven't got a clue what's going on with that vehicle. Yeah, I just don't know what's the best. I've been caught fire alarm. We're going to end up with 500 people back out on the street again. Yeah, received. I don't think they can advise by ringing those rings on that side just to keep away from the you. Go off at this stage. Actually, that's 70 to 50. Go ahead. Welcome to the manager at the parking. As Cresti County is going to close the restaurant and move, catch the music way to the opposite side of the building that overlooks this abandoned car. We're not doing anything to the hotel rings at the moment. The somebody wants to escalate it. We'll have to have a look at it through in the ring. Yeah, we've got that. I for one fire alarm. I for one fire. I've got a ambulance goal to these vehicles. It's off of the bottom of Cheedham Hill Road, where the enemy in the rear is. You need to get to one's bank doing all of that. I for one fire, you've got one who needs to get to one's bank. Yeah, ambulance goal. You need to get to one's bank. You just direct us. Second, one nine four one five. Where the dialed directing out here to one's bank can somebody let him through when he arrives. So on the one's bank, spare where this ambulance officer is making his way up on the bank. I see somebody here looking for. I see somebody there. Yeah, the manager of the reddit's and park in the hotel, obviously where the vehicle's parked. Want you to know whether to keep the members of the public inside or to let them out of the building. Can you let us off with? Would say key to the minute of the moment. Man, I want five. I know one five, but. Yeah, the heart of this isn't this one. Unfortunately, I think it's better to keep the length of the moment because otherwise, we're not people walking all over the road. That car is literally opposite the shower walking near the hammock. I'll have more. Yeah, we see five, two, seven zero. We see her. Thank you. Seven. Hey, somebody can I go? Yeah, with some members of the public here that should be staying in hotel that are within the cord and. I've been somewhere set up for people to just wait. Five, two, seven zero. Yeah, there's anybody with it to the world here. The moment. Yeah, it's under obstacle. Yeah, I think you've been driven up in a moment. And we've all got the Audi under us. Yeah, five four. I can see it for a talent. I think it's going to trap him. I think we've done to the Lord Street. The Audi's driven off Lord Street. Any direction's what you're last to do. It's just going like left on the Lord Street. Left on the Lord Street. Yeah, received. Excellent. 1738. I'm directly down this vehicle. Well, 758 directly behind the vehicle. We got some air, please, please. Yeah, we are doing any extra eggholes? Followed by Channel receiving. Yeah, it's a normal road street. Channel wall, south wall street. Going towards south wall street. Normal road streets received. Any extra eggholes? Any extra eggholes? Seven. The road on 14, 17, 17, 12. Okay, okay. We've got left on south wall street. We're now towards very new road. South wall, south wall, very new road now. We're all too cheeky, the most oldies. I'm sorry, very new road. We're going to indicate into the right. Act 270. Can we confirm the air? The air under the vehicle when it's first. So it keeps our attention. So it's confirmed is they're correct vehicle. We've got FOX from Victor 05, Oscar for Power Oscar. Just confirm that's correct. Is it there? Yes, sir. Yes, confirm what's location of the vehicle now. 015. 015. It might still run there, please. Channel 9, Philver receiving. Channel 9, 015. Please, up to 9, eh? Just a bit quickly. I've got West York ARVs with me. Six of them. So, look to the troll for iconic sight. Have we located where those sights are? We want them to go. Stand by on the standing vehicles. Move to off. I've got enough to follow in. 1758. Excellent. The goal set, please. 36, Oscar. 1736, good. Last normal, location police of the visual patrol. Follow in the possible suspect. Of the very good old. Um, he's on the traffic channel. He's still in broad and lane. I'll just truck him. No more. OK, he's handy dogman. I'm great. Close to eight, junction Sussex Street. Head into our lower broad and roll. OK, mate. Got an hour on the way. A video posted on Twitter, early on the 23rd of May 2017, shows armed officers stopping a grey vehicle and apprehending the driver. Fucking armed. Fucking armed police, man. Oh, shit. It was filmed at the crossroads of Trinity Way and Black Fryers Road, which is where the Audi vehicle was heading. So the following facts are established from the police radio conversations occurring in this order. An Asian male got out of a grey Audi vehicle shortly before the blast. The vehicle was left on Chitim Hill Road, which is close to the arena. He ran towards the arena with a rock sack on his back. An Asian male put a rock sack on the arena floor next to the wall. The Asian male then ran out of the area avoiding the blast. The Audi car was later driven off sometime after the blast and pursued by armed police. The car was stopped and the driver apprehended. The public inquiry did not reproduce the radio communications I have just shown for scrutiny or examination. It did, however, produce a dictophone recording from Inspector Dale Sexton, the forced duty officer who was situated in a control room directing operations. The dictophone conversations line up with the radio communications. Although around the time of the arrest, there are a number of reductions, so we can't hear everything that is said. Then about 10 minutes after the arrest, a report comes back to Sexton saying it was not a suspicious male, and it is then forgotten about. However, there was no discussion by the inquiry about closing off Cheetim Hill Road, or locking down a hotel, or about the fact that the roadblock prevented a gold commander getting to the scene, and no further discussion about the apprehending of a suspect in a grey Audi. The issue was very quickly glossed over. The inquiry did not explore what happened to the Asian male driver after he was apprehended, or explain why he ran towards the arena wearing a rock sack. For obvious reasons, this is a serious emission. After the inquiry listened to Dale Sexton's dictophone evidence, Boris DePaul Green EQC summarised various points, completely leaving out any mention of the grey Audi incident. From 1116 PM, the situation that you were dealing with became more complicated, perhaps even confused, because you were from that point, faced with a report, or even reports, or another suspicious character, or characters that needed to be dealt with. So there's a person that's spoken about, near the cathedral. There's a thought that someone is going to Picadilly, and you were also confronted with a discarded jacket near to the cathedral, which was thought to be on top of something, and therefore to be suspicious. So those were matters that complicated the situation you were dealing with. Is that correct? And a person in an Audi car? And a person in an Audi car? Yes, sir. Although that was quite short-lived, I think. Was it not? There was no further discussion about this issue after this point. The radio communications reveal that the police were dealing with the Asian male in his grey Audi for about an hour, and were highly concerned about it. In my opinion, Paul Greenie's comment that the grey Audi incident was quite short-lived is an attempt to suppress critically important evidence, which could confirm that Salman Abadi did not in fact commit suicide. I will make a general point here about the public inquiry. On a number of occasions, it is clear that Sir John Saunders is not closely involved with preparing the evidence or testimonies that were heard at the inquiry. The inquiry legal team seemed to know far more than he did about what evidence was being selected or redacted. It is my opinion that the inquiry legal team were deliberately omitting evidence, such as the evidence I have just shown, which would reveal the true nature of the whole event. I believe that Sir John Saunders was effectively being steered by the inquiry legal team so that he adhered to the official narrative which was set out at the start of the inquiry. I believe that Sir John Saunders is not closely involved with the inquiry legal team or redacted. An expert witness at the public inquiry testified that the type of explosives used in the explosive device was T-A-TP, tri- delivered by the public inquiry. Yes, that video gave instructions to manufacture T-A-TP, which was the explosive used at the Manchester Arena. Let's have a look at a T-A-TP explosion. Just in front of the orange water balloon is 0.5 grams of T-A-TP or about 168th of an ounce. It's about the size of a sugar packet. We're going to detonate it with current from a 9 volt battery. The water balloon is just to illustrate the effect. Let's look at the first frame, about a hundredth of a second after the detonation. You can see the shock wave has already hit the camera, maybe 10 feet away, and that's why the picture is blurry. The rubber balloon has been blown away, but the water, which is much more inertia, is still in place. And there is no flame. T-A-TP is what's called an entropic explosive. It works by creating a huge quantity of gas very quickly, what little energy there is is goes into creating the shock wave. No light is given off in a T-A-TP explosion. No flash, no smoke and no heat. The explosion is only blast. There would be no flash of light and there would be no smoke or heat. Let's now see how witnesses actually described the blast. And then massive flash of light. And I mean it was like, you know, sheet lightning. It was like that filled the whole room. And the heat was just unbelievable. I just remember feeling really hot. And like all of a sudden, like I was like really, really hot and felt loads of heat. This warm gush of air hit me. And I remember that it just felt really warm. You describe an orange flash directly followed by a loud bang and a feeling of weight and pressure and heat. Is that accurate? Yes, I think the bang came first. I couldn't, I could only see orange in my field of sight. So it felt like a flash. Crack bang and a flash. And of course, the impact, the energy gave you a knock. And smoke like a pinky smoke. And I would describe it. I'd have been seeing the film backdrop, but it was a big white flash. The first thing I remember was a bright flash. Really bright. Bang. The louds I've ever heard and I've flashed. The flash. The brightest flash I've ever seen in my life. Orange flash. Like a photo would give off. Like a fire with kind of color. A wash of orange light. Surrounding the roof. Plains rolled. Thick black smoke. My initial thought was that it was a thunder flash, which is a parotechnic device used in the army to simulate explosions. We have here 14 independent witnesses who all describe something which is wholly inconsistent with the TATP Explosive device. This CCTV image shows the arena doors at 22.04, 27 minutes before the blast. This image, which has been heavily redacted, shows the same arena doors at 22.36, 5 minutes after the blast. A comparison of the two images of the doors indicates that there was smoke in the city room. This evidence and the witness testimony suggest that the inquiry is incorrect or has deliberately misled the public about the type of explosives used in the device. There are a significant number of people who I will mention later, who were close to the device when it went off, but did not appear to be hurt or marked. Also, there are no photographic images that I have been able to find showing any serious injury or death located within the city room. It is more likely therefore that the device used was a parotechnic type device, not a TATP device. The public inquiry did not draw any attention to this glaring anomaly in the evidence. The inquiry did present evidence, however, which showed that in the day as prior to the 22nd of May 2017 Salmanabadi purchased large quantities of sulfuric acid, acetone and hydrogen peroxide, plus other equipment required to make the TATP device. But the evidence presented here shows that the TATP device was not used. This means that Salmanabadi may have acquired from somewhere else an entirely different type of device which was far less harmful or completely harmless to be used in the attack. The purchasing of the materials may have been done to construct a pre-planned fake narrative. In my previous film, I suggested that these images of the city room were probably taken in the morning in some sort of drill or preparation. CCTV evidence, which has been released since I made that film, has led me to suspect that these images may in fact have been taken shortly after the time of the blast. The evidence is conflicting as the timestamp on the Chris Parker image clearly shows a much earlier time. But I'm going to go with the official narrative here that these images were taken shortly after the blast. No building damage can be seen in this image. The merchandise stall is completely intact. Other images taken also show that windows were not shattered by the blast. This image does not show convincing evidence of an injury or death. Although a firm conclusion cannot be drawn from these images alone about whether the victims pictured are real or staged, the images are consistent with a drill or an exercise. Now the public inquiry did produce photographs showing building damage, for example to the blue and white doors seen in these pictures. However, none of that damage can be seen in these images, which were taken much earlier than the crime scene images produced at the inquiry. For comparison, here's a picture of the Omar bomb which killed a similar number of people. Victim Ruth Morelle was featured in a Sky News program on 23rd of the 5th 2017 and she said the following to the queen. The CCTV image is sure that between 2219 and 2228 that Ruth Morelle was indeed waiting with her daughter's friend's mum Michelle Kiss. And fast forward to 2228. We see Ruth Morelle and Michelle Kiss still standing together. But the next image, two minutes later, Michelle Kiss has gone and Ruth Morelle is now standing on the steps with her daughter. Go forward again. This image is one second before the blast. Where is Michelle Kiss? She says in her statement, myself and my daughter's friend's mum, we were waiting. Michelle Kiss isn't there. This is one second before the blast. Ruth Morelle speaks here about her and what happened to you? I had a mother's birthday as well. She was so happy. Not so bad. So everybody's grateful. The picture reminds me of a 15-centimeter outweigh of the sun. So I'm doing surgery with Tron's after the night. But I'm feeling okay about it because when you see these children, you just think they need to get a grip here and sort of buckle on. They just inspire you. Yes, that's splendid. Two images of her alleged injury after it had healed were shown on the ITV news website. These images do appear to show that something has gone through this leg and out the other side. However, in the camera-phone video filmed by John Barr shortly after the blast, Ruth Morelle is seen walking perfectly normally without any sign of pain or a limp, with a dark red patch on her right leg where the injury is supposed to have occurred. She places her full weight on each foot and shows no sign whatsoever of a limp or an injury. She would not be able to walk normally as she is seen doing if she had just sustained the injury shown here. Video evidence is much stronger than witness testimony and should take primacy over the things she said verbally about her injury. I will point out here that the Ruth Morelle injury is the only picture of an injury within the city room that I have been able to find. The one victim we have where we can see the injury appears to be fake. Another alleged victim, Amy Barlow, is featured in three videos shortly after the blast. In the first video, she is seen running down the Victoria Station steps, fleeing from the blast scene. She runs down the steps showing no sign of an injury or a limp and without any blood dripping onto the floor. In the second video, she is seen walking brisply out of the Victoria Train Station entrance, again with no sign of any blood. And in the third video, sometime later, she is seen sitting on a wall outside the Victoria Station, when what looks like large amounts of blood appear to start dripping from her legs. If she had been injured with shrapnel, the bleeding would have started immediately as she was running blood would have spilled onto the floor. The evidence suggests she may have been using a device to create the effect of bleeding in the third video. We have here on video two victims exhibiting what appear to be fake injuries. Due to the lack of photographic evidence of any genuine injury situated within the arena foyer, it is a reasonable assumption to make that if two of the victims were exhibiting fake injuries that some others or all of the other victims may have been exhibiting fake injuries as well. The following is a list of 28 people who were in the city room or it is claimed were in the city room, but little or no evidence, apart from some verbal testimony, has been shown to show that they were in fact harmed. Note I am not saying they were all definitely not harmed. I am saying I have not found convincing evidence that any of them were harmed. I have identified 10 of the 28 people from this list within CCTV images at times shortly before the blast. We see Jordan Beak, Dave Middleton, Daniel Perry, Sarah Nellist, Kim McEwan, Izzy Aron and Joe Aron in this image one second before the blast. We see Muhammad Agha in this image one second before the blast and we see Barbara Whitaker and Andrea Bradbury in this image three minutes before the blast. The diagram shows the approximate positions of those 10 people at the time of the blast. Note there are 18 more people from the list who are not in this diagram, some of whom may have been situated in the CCTV blind spot which is very close to the blast area. I am going to look now at all the emergency services that responded to the incident, starting with British Transport Police who were responsible for policing the city room. It was revealed in the testimony of officers Stephen Koch that it was standard practice before the end of every Manchester Arena concert for safety reasons to have British Transport Police officers located on the Mezzanine level within the city room as people were leaving the concert. Was it to your mind in May of 2017 important that there should be within the city room on egress from a concert members of BTP present? That was always the case. And you said it was always the case we'll need to look at that. But just to focus in on my precise question was it to your mind important that there should be people from BTP present? So on the night no British Transport Police officer was present in the city room when the blast occurred. A number of BTP officers ended the city room a few minutes after the blast. The regular greater Manchester Police started arriving at 2246, 15 minutes after the blast. These officers were primarily involved in using improvised stretcher devices such as railings to carry 38 surviving alleged victims at a rate of about one per minute from the city room down the steps to the Victoria Station Concourse. Note that these officers were mainly involved in moving people, not in giving treatment. Police officers and others were helping in moving whoever we could really and then it come to a point where the paramedic Mr Ernie said then start at issue in P1's P2's to categorize prioritized perhaps at a stage. So if we cut one stage we were trying to take as many casualties downstairs for treatment and then at some stage. On the basis of how injured they appeared to be? I think it was a guess of yes how injured and who was dealing with that particular injury? Okay but the only person who actually categorized as P1, P2 or P3 would have been Mr Ernie's in the first instance until the other two came. Yes so that would be correct. The senior greater Manchester Police person in the city room throughout the duration of the response was Inspector Mike Smith. It was established at the public inquiry that Smith had no line of command to any senior officer within Greater Manchester Police during the response. Despite the fact that you alerted Silver at 2237 or asked the control room to alert Silver as to what was happening and what you were doing and despite the fact that the F-Win would have alerted the F-DO to what you were doing. No contact was made with you and therefore no line of command between you and either of those tactical commanders was established. No. Testimony was also heard at the inquiry that Greater Manchester Police officers were falsifying first-hand witness statements. This is what sort of obviously got me really frustrated with the police because they continue to change my statement and I refuse to sign them because they weren't saying what I'd said. Paddy Ennis was the first paramedic to arrive at the scene. In his inquiry interview he claims but does not seem sure that he was at the scene by 2242. This appears to be incorrect because he is first seen on CCTV outside of the Victoria Station at 2250. He then walks into the Victoria Station at 2250 and 22 seconds. There is another CCTV image of him at 2252 and 48 seconds on the bridge which leads into the city room. Therefore he would have arrived in the city room at 2253 which is 22 minutes after the blast. This means there were no paramedics at the scene until 22 minutes after the blast. At the public inquiry Paddy Ennis stated that he did not go into the city room to treat any patients. When you went into the city room was it to obtain further information, to treat any casualties who might be there or a combination of the two or something else? It wasn't to treat casualties because that wouldn't have been appropriate at that stage based on my role but it was to gain situation and awareness in order to be able to pass that information back and then to potentially then take one of the strategic roles, an operational commander until I was relieved at that role. At 2301 Paddy Ennis is seen on CCTV leaving the city room and walking back down to the Victoria Station. Therefore he only spent just over seven minutes in the city room and did not treat any patients while he was there. He is then seen on CCTV back in the city room at 23 or 5. Two more paramedics Christopher Hargrey's and Leivon are seen on CCTV arriving in the city room at 2315 which is 44 minutes after the blast. In total there were only three paramedics attended the scene, the first attending 22 minutes after the blast without treating anyone and the other two attending 44 minutes after the blast. The bronze commander paramedic Dan Smith did not go to the scene in the city room but directed operations from a Victoria Station concourse downstairs. The reason given as to why only three paramedics attended the scene was because the city room had been declared a hot zone and therefore not safe. The two paramedics who went into the city room after Paddy Ennis were specialist trained, heart hazardous area response team which is why only they were permitted to go in. Despite there being a further four heart trained paramedics who had arrived at the Victoria Station, this seems farcical because many unarmed British transport police and great amounters to police officers who are not hazardous area trained ended the city room during this time. Paramedics Simon Butler arrived at the arena in an ambulance at 2310 and was present at the Victoria Station helping with victims until around 2.30 in the morning. Therefore he was present attending the victims for over three hours. He was asked by the inquiry about the patients being brought down on makeshift stretches to the Victoria Station concourse. Is it correct that there were patients you saw that brought down that had not had any tourniquets applied to them? Yes, those patients that didn't have tourniquets. But that doesn't imply that necessarily needed them. Were the people who you thought just visually needed them that hadn't had them or can't you really say? I don't remember seeing anybody in the concourse area that had a large active lead. Would it be fair to say that from the witnesses you the casualties you do describe, you were able to see evidence that there had been significant bleeding from their clothing? Yes, there had obviously been significant bleeding from the phoenix and I saw what on the floor in the concourse area but I didn't see a patient actually actually actively bleeding. So for a period of three hours directly dealing with victims, Simon Butler did not witness any patient actively bleeding. Several paramedics specifically stated that they did not treat anyone. So did you actually treat any of the casualties? No, I didn't know. No. I think you described in your winter statement that you didn't need to provide any direct hands-on medical assistance to any casualty. Yes, I mean, and that's very much by design but if there were in that initial walk-around, if there's initial one where we think well actually we're so short at the moment that we haven't yet reached the enough resources to manage the immediate life saving than I would assist in immediate life saving but when we get to the established command and control system I should not really be doing that. And just so we're clear then in terms of having been asked by Mr Smith to treat and triage, what does that role mean to you and what do you be expected to do once you went through please? You would be expected to do a preliminary triage of the patients that have been brought down or secondary triage now of their status now, they've been brought down to the train station of what category the patients were at that point and so in doing that what is physically involved that you have to undertake is the triage officer checking a respiratory rate and a heart rate and their conscious level and then triage accordingly to the patient's condition. Can I ask was there an issue with pain relief for the patients? Was this sufficient and allgisia available for those patients in the casualty clearing area? I remember getting some morphine for a crew from another ambulance crew but I don't recall any issues being brought to my attention of pain relief and required apart from when advanced paramedic had turned up to speak to me regarding ketamine. Another question you indicated that the sole task you've been given was to triage but again would it be fair to say that part of your all as well was if you came across individuals needing immediate life saving treatment that such as the application of a tunicate that fell well within the role that you were being tasked to do in the city room. I think you've already included that part of triage with this. Yes, that's about yes. A document that's prepared by the National ambulance resilience unit that addresses the role of a primary triage officer and is this the role in which you saw yourself once you are in the city room? Is that all? No, so that's the role that I would say Paddy would take over instead because he was the one that had communications and he was on the major incident channel and at the time we thought well it's best that myself and Chris worked together and we report back to Paddy who can then report onto the major incident channel to the relevance people required. The role of a primary triage officers you sometimes don't even engage with patient treatment. I think there was a there was an I knew that there were seriously injured patients in that room and obviously part of what we needed to do was provide them with care and treatment and to do so urgently. Well to set up the system to do so urgently I think you've heard of the other evidence but you know part of my job at the scene is not necessarily and this I totally appreciate that this will seem strange to people but it's not necessarily to direct immediate care and treatment but it's to start setting up the system to enable us to manage all the patients not just those in the city room there were patients elsewhere. Okay well let's just take it step by step I think you're asking the next question in a way. No no it's all right but you wouldn't how they were going to be treated it's the next question but you didn't know at that time that there were a number of patients who required urgent treatment and then you had to decide how best to do it. I did know that there was yes. Yes. Yes. And was it your job to ensure that those who required urgent treatment got it as soon as possible? Yes. And in those circumstances and bearing in mind you were working on the basis that only Padiennis was in there should it have been your priority to get paramedics in numbers into the city room? It should have been my priority to set up the correct system to manage those patients and I'm not trying to deflect the question in such as I then had to always require to turn my mind to how we were going to provide that urgent treatment and an option would be obviously to send lots of paramedics into the city room and option would be you know there are a million options that were available to me and my job on that scene as the operational commander was to establish command and control all the things that have already been mentioned and as part of that establish the correct and best possible system for those patients. I don't think I'd agree that it immediately translates that I have to send lots of paramedics into like or lots of professional clinicians into that room it translates that I have to settle the correct system to manage that incident. It is widely known that the fire service were kept well away from the arena for two hours following the time of the blast. This has been a very contentious issue and a source of complete bewilderment for many in the fire service. Michaila Turner was a fire crew manager at Manchester Central Fire Station with ten years of service and was in charge of one of the pumps. On the night she was stationed at Manchester G16 Central Fire Station. Does that print out then tell you where you've got to mobilize to? That's correct, Mum, yes. You say that you checked the mobile data terminal in the appliance and the turnout at 22, 49 hours showed that both of the pumps from Manchester Central and G18.1 were to rendezvous point at G18 Phillips Park. That is correct. And you say this, this felt wrong to me as G18 is about two miles further away from the arena than G16. That's correct, Mum, yes. Again, is there any other expansion you want to make to that statement? It was a lot of confusion. There was a lot of confusion and I remember we kind of, as we just pulled out slightly of the engine outs, I recall the appliances stopping as we were talking the crews were asking what's going on. There was a really short space of time and I just said to my crew at the time, there must be something else that we don't know about. There's got to be something else. So it was just a lot of confusion at the time. On the night there were 14 first-aiders on duty at the arena. I have listed them here, a number of them went into the city room shortly after the blast. They were the first people to treat casualties. From this list of 14 first-aiders, the public inquiry only interviewed three. They were Ian Perry, Ryan Billington and Jade Juxbury who did not enter the city room. This means that eight of the people who were first on the scene to respond and treat people were not interviewed by the public inquiry. The public inquiry and cursing report asserted that the first armed officers arrived up the scene at 2243 which is 12 minutes after the blast. This CCTV image shows two armed officers entering Victoria Station at 2242 and 52 seconds. In 2019 I received correspondence from a person who had interviewed a rowdy who was present at the Manchester arena on the night. The rowdy witnessed armed police in the arena within a minute after the blast. In his statement he says, as you come off the stage of the arena, perhaps a 50-yard walk to the loading bay and then out to the back of the staff entrance, so it would take what a minute. And as we come out of the loading bay, there were eight armed police officers coming running past, which is where I think they had some sort of intelligence about this because the armed response were there that quick. Further evidence that the armed response were there far quicker than the public inquiry suggested comes from witness Darren Costa. Can you describe what happened as you arrived at the foot of those steps that take you up to the footbridge? Almost immediately there's arrived at the foot of the steps. I heard a small explosion. I saw a little flash of dust and light from the above the concourse area and I just start walking towards it. And in your statement I think you say that you saw a cloud of dust coming out of the arena doors. That's correct. Just so we're clear, the doors you're referring to there are the doors from the footbridge into what we know as the city room. That is correct. You've described in your statement at times as the foyer. And you say a loud bang in the statement? I wouldn't say it's particularly low, sir. That's what's actually in the statement. Not particularly. They're all red. In comparison to other explorers' arf adios. Thank you. Now pausing at the point at which you get to those doors into the city room and you'll understand why I say that. Can you explain what you did off you heard that loud bang and saw the cloud of dust? I started to walk towards where I've seen the explosion and the the flash. And as I got quite way up the stairs, the people were evacuating quite rapidly. So I moved over to the left on side, held the hand rail as I walked up to try and get myself past people coming out of the arena. As you were making your way up those stairs and across the footbridge towards the arena doors, did you at that stage try to call your son? Very opposed to him that yes I did try calling some. I understand initially there was no answer and you sent me a message. No, so I sent the text message. And a short time later I think you time it at between 1032, 1034, you received a message back from your son saying he was okay. Yes, I've been in fact he left the city room. He had, yes. I'm now going to move on to what I was describing as topic three. So the experience that you had in the city room and the assistance that you provided. All right. And I want to make clear to those who are listening and watching that we have discussed the importance of giving that evidence but also doing so in a way that avoids distressing and graphic details. Yes, all right. And that's the approach that I'll be taking to the questions I ask. Now you entered the city room through those doors from the footbridge and you described the scene as one of carnage for reasons we do not need to go into it. By the time you've gone in, had you received the text message from your son? No, how did you say? Okay, thank you. In your statement you described that one of the first actions you took was shutting the city room doors after you'd gone in. Can you explain why you did that? Possibly a number of reasons. The first one I could see something through the doors. So I just thought I'll be used to see that. So I closed the doors but also it's part of my military police to preserve the scene. And I also wanted to, when you think about secondary, how the shooters or explosions do want to have them line aside of anybody in there. So first thing more shut the doors, at least then nobody can see what's going on inside. From this testimony, Darren Costa would have shut the city room doors probably within two or three minutes of the blast. Later in his account, he talks about the city room doors again. So the police officers were around, yes. Did you see police officers' guns? Initially so, I'd have wrapped within, again, it's well within the 10 minutes because I just closed the doors and as I got to the last door, the two armed officers that appeared, they were still making communication with the establishing communications. And I said something, it's still like, well, you need more of our form and I've got something like that. Based on Costa's statements, I would estimate that the armed police were at the city room less than three minutes after the blast. Darren Costa clearly states that the armed officers were there well within the 10 minutes. From this, Costa must know that the official arrival time of the armed police was about after 10 minutes, which is why he is telling the inquiry that it was well within the 10 minutes. Note also, from the Rodi's statement, these armed officers came in through a different entrance. This evidence is important because it suggests that authorities had foreknowledge of what was going to occur. Sending firearms officers in early would be a good way of securing the scene so that only allocated persons could enter. Just to inform you that Darren Costa died in a car crash three months after giving this evidence at the public inquiry. So in summary, it is clear that British Transport Police, Greater Manchester Police, the ambulance service and the fire service were all inhibited in different ways by their chain of command from attending to the incident in a normal fashion. British Transport Police were kept out of the city room until after the blast. This is highly unusual. Greater Manchester Police did not establish any chain of command with the senior officer at the scene throughout the emergency response period. This is highly unusual. The fire service was sent to a rendezvous point two miles further away from the arena than they were already situated and then not allowed near the arena for two hours. This is highly unusual. The ambulance service were only allowed to send three paramedics to attend the scene. Two of them arriving 44 minutes after the blast, despite there being four more heart-trained paramedics on site, this is highly unusual. Eight of the arena first-aiders who were the first trained people to respond at the scene were not interviewed by the public inquiry. This is highly unusual. It appears that armed officers were at the arena much earlier than the public inquiry asserted. This is highly unusual. Although these facts have been passed off as incompetence or because the city room was a hot zone, it is entirely possible considering all the other evidence presented so far that the inhibition of the emergency services was done deliberately because somebody high up in the command chain knew that the incident was a pre-planned staged attack. This is an image released by the inquiry from camera 14 taken shortly before the blast. This is another image released by the inquiry from camera 14 taken after the blast. These images show the extent to which the inquiry team redacted important details about the events. The extent of censorship is so excessive that the images do not show what happened. The inquiry meticulously redacted large swathes of detail from the CCTV images before they were released. Any CCTV image taken after the blast which featured details of alleged victims was fully redacted. This means that the inquiry did not show the public what actually happened to any of the victims. The inquiry also heavily redacted another area which was not affected by the blast. In the diagram I have marked an area in pink which would not have been affected by a blast as it is behind a wall. This CCTV image shows that pink area viewed from above the single door looking towards the city room. The image is the last unredacted CCTV image released from this camera taken 22 minutes before the blast. All the CCTV images released from this camera after the point of the blast have the same large area redacted. What is being concealed by the inquiry team? Evidence has already been presented of victims exhibiting fake injuries so could this area be where the preparation of fake victims took place? The inquiry was chaired by former High Court Judge Sir John Saunders. In his statement upon delivery of volume 2 of his report he said this. In the course of the evidence of what happened after the explosion I saw CCTV evidence and video from body-worn cameras of the city room. That showed clearly the appalling aftermath of the explosion. It showed those who had died within seconds of the explosion. It showed victims with appalling injuries. I have considered post-mortem evidence and expert evidence which confirmed that those who died did so as a result of injuries caused by a bomb exploding. There can be no question on the evidence that those who died died as a result of the actions of Salmane Béry which caused the severe injuries suffered by many people who attended the concert or were waiting to collect children who had attended. Sir John Saunders may well be being truthful in that he has been shown CCTV and body-worn camera footage of an aftermath. It has been shown in this film that the blast and the immediate area surrounding the blast was probably not captured by any CCTV camera. The CCTV images from the city room are all from low-definition cameras situated a considerable distance away from concert goers. If the event was a staged attack using mock victims such as Ruth Morel described earlier images from CCTV and body-worn cameras could look very realistic, especially to someone who was already convinced that people were seriously injured and died. It would be far better if Sir John Saunders released this evidence instead of just speaking about it. The same applies with post-mortem evidence. The public has not been shown photographs from post-mortem evidence where victims can be clearly identified. Sir John Saunders statements suggest that he may not have seen any high definition crime scene photographs. Why does Sir John Saunders not refer to the far more evidentially important professionally taken high definition crime scene photographs? In a proper investigation there would be several crime scene photographs taken of each deceased victim in situ where they died. To date I have found no convincing evidence produced by the inquiry or other sources which proves beyond doubt that deaths occurred due to a bomb blast in the city room on the 22nd of May 2017. Many of the points raised in this film could be further proven by viewing the entire CCTV footage leading up to the blast of all the major cameras. This would be a simple thing for the inquiry to do and there is no reason why they should not have done it. An alleged victim who was one of the closest persons to the blast was Andrea Bradbury. Bradbury has eight years experience working in counterterrorism. She was seen on CCTV at 2154 at the city room Arena Doors which is very close to where the device was later set off. Note that this is 37 minutes before the blast. She remained at this location for 9 minutes before leaving. She was asked at the public inquiry where did she go when she left the city room at 22 or 4? It is now 22 or 417 and Barbara appears to have a brief conversation with Jordan Beak of ShowSec. Do you remember Barbara speaking to a ShowSec employee? Yes, we have been talking to them all night about what time things were finishing. I wanted to try and move the car and get a bit nearer and turn the car around so we were literally first to get straight out and away. We asked the team from the stewards that it is around 10 o'clock but it is definitely going to carry on until half past 10. I met the decision that we had sufficient time to get to the car and attempt to move it to a better position. It is just go, I am so sorry I did not mean to do that. No, and then we returned. We can see that Barbara had the conversation with Jordan Beak the two of you then walk away. I am right that what we are seeing there is the two of you having been told the concert is not going to end before 1030 so you are walking away to go to the car to move it closer to the venue. Yes, because there is the potential some of the sad streets clear when people leave work for the day. They park in those cheap free spots so I literally wanted to get it as close and turn it so it was literally first to quickest exit. And is that what you then did? It is, but I actually couldn't move it as it happened. I see, but that is what you wanted to do. After the device had been set off and rear Bradbury stated that she teleformed a counterterrorism officer at 2236. She then got a taxi to Greater Manchester Police headquarters where the counterterrorism unit is based. Her story about why she was at the arena seemed contrived in my opinion. Was she part of an operation which was conducting a stage to attack and there to observe and report back on the proceedings? After all the alleged victims had been taken down to the Victoria Station Concourse at 119 the crime scene was closed down and taken over by counterterrorism. Much testimony was heard at the inquiry about counterterrorism's involvement at the arena in the months leading up to the 22nd of May 2017. The counterterror branch is based just two miles from the arena at Manchester Police headquarters. Greater Manchester Police employ five counterterrorism liaison officers whose job it is to liaise with organisations in the community and advise them on how to watch out for or protect against potential terrorist attacks. Each liaison officer covers a different area of Manchester. The Manchester arena was the responsibility of liaison officer Ken Oppam. In the time leading up to the bombing a number of different terror exercises were organised at the arena by Ken Oppam. Prior to the 22nd of May Ken Oppam was spending more time at the arena than usual which was commented upon. Now you're going to tell us about the relationship between the CTSA, Ken Oppam and SMG in both its zero-regard them positive aspects and negative aspects. I think that the positive aspects were that Ken Oppam as a CTSA went above and beyond what was required of him at the time in relation to the PSI process, how did he do that? He visited the site more than the mandated two visits a year. He was in regular communication with Miriam Stone, both by visits, I mean, Miriam Stone had mentioned a statement. They dropped in sometimes and announced and he was in regular communication. From SMG perspective, I've got to commend SMG as well in the way that they worked with Ken Oppam. There appeared to be no reluctance to engage with him some sites when the approach with the CTSA might be quite reluctant to engage. SMG Miriam Stone and Leesonet were quite happy to engage with Ken Oppam and discussed the PSI process. There was positive engagement on both sides. The other thing that I would class as positive was the CTSA offered a number of training courses to SMG, such as Project Griffon and SMG took them up and said as many staff as they could and that in itself is a very good point because it increases the ability of the site to understand what the risk and threat is. As we know, if an attack is going to happen, it's going to happen. That's a phrase that we seen a number of places and had someone in particular used that phrase in their discussions with you. It was, yeah, Ken Oppam used it a number of times. Did you discuss that possibility and whether it was necessary and all to be safe with Ken Oppam or Stawaii? We talked about city rooms as an area. We talked about all the entrances and other risks that were around other entrances. We did talk about city rooms and that was really where he said, well, you know, if somebody's got in there. Note also that Ken Oppam did not give evidence of the public inquiry. It was reported that he had COVID. His boss, Elizabeth Foster, who was based at the Counterterrorism Branch at the Manchester Police Headquarters, is seen here being interviewed by Barrister Pete Weatherby. They are talking about how busy Ken Oppam was leading up to the time of the bombing. It wasn't just tight that venues of this type that he was dealing with. He was also responsible for a number of national infrastructure sites as well. That's correct. And he also had a number of different things to his bow. So he dealt with hazardous material sites. Yes. He dealt with military and private sites which dealt with sensitive information. He dealt with advising public figures including politicians correct about rats and threat mitigation correct. And he dealt with briefings to local businesses. Yes. Yes. DT is important to local authority planning processes. Correct. And he dealt with CT training, briefing and things like. Correct. Yes. I'm not. Have I missed anything significant out? No. No, I think that's the main workstreams. Yeah. Yeah. So it would be fair to say that he had a difficult and own roast job. And frankly, he was pretty thin. No criticism. Certainly had enough work to keep him occupied. Yes. Yes. Okay. Well, I won't prove all with words. What are they smoking about? Why is it funny that Ken Oppam was particularly busy at this time? Whether he is also seen smoking when he interviews Inspector Mike Smith who was the man in charge of the city room. In this next clip, Pete Weatherby is trying to explain away why a major incident was not declared. So you might have expected, I mean, we know that neither Mr. Sector nor Mr. No as declared a major incident themselves. But you might have expected given what you were faced with and your very fair concession that you overlooked the declaration of a major incident. But you might have expected a line of command for one of them to have said, have we declared a major incident? Yeah. And also, I think I mentioned yesterday, you know, I probably made that wrong assumption that one of those two would have already have done that. Yes. And as you've said, they about should have done. I'm certainly not being critical of you, Mr. Smith. I'll finish with this very bizarre observation. The inquiry produced lots of redacted still images of the city room after the blast. He was a sequence of images from a period starting at 2248 and going on until 1am, where we see fumes of some sort being given off by something. The fumes are being produced for over two hours without receding. Is it a smoke machine? There might be a rational explanation for this, but again, to my knowledge, the issue was not addressed at the public inquiry. Now, some who are watching this still might not be grasping fully what I'm saying. So I'm going to give you my opinion on what I believe took place. This is my opinion. This is my opinion. This is my opinion. It is not a statement of fact. It is not an assertion. It is an honestly held opinion based on the research that I've done. It is just an opinion and it's just my personal opinion. I repeat, it is not an assertion. From my research and investigation, I believe that the Manchester Arena bombing incident was a carefully constructed complex operation planned by various public sector agencies. I believe the alleged perpetrator was a controlled intelligent asset who played his role for some weeks before the attack, being caught on CCTV, gathering the materials for the device, etc. I do not believe he was killed in the attack after fleeing the scene in a grey Audi vehicle. I believe that the regular police who were not part of the operation arrested him by mistake, but he was then cleared. I believe a number of members of the public as many as a hundred or more were recruited to take part in the mock terrorist attack, and part of their role was to report to the media and to the public their experience of the incident. This involved some of the participants on the night, exhibiting fake injuries using fake blood and other fake injury kits. I believe the operation was planned and coordinated by a national government agency and orchestrated at a local level by the Countreterra department at greater Manchester police headquarters. I believe that Countreterra used their liaison officer to set up the event and recruit a number of staff at the arena who also played roles on the night. I believe a small number within the emergency services teams were briefed and knew the event was a staged attack as they were responding. However, I suspect the vast majority of the emergency services personnel did not know the event was staged, including most in the control rooms. All the emergency services were inhibited in different ways by their chain of command from responding in a normal fashion. I believe the event was made to look fairly realistic using a loud pyra technique or similar device and some witnesses in the city room were fooled into thinking the event was real. If someone were to suggest that the most seriously injured people who were very visibly damaged were in fact injured shortly before the attack in