Uncovering Vietnam, did they kill Col. James Winterbottom in1969?

Video Transcript:

Hey everyone, I just want to make this video and I want to share it say right off the bat that I am very grateful and thankful for anyone that watches this or downloads this. This is very important to me and I just appreciate any time or effort you put into this. I've been a researcher now for eight or nine years, conspiracy analysts, wherever you want to call me. And everything I've done up to this point is prepared me for this video. This is probably the most important video to date that I am going to make. And I just want to share it with you guys. And I apologize in advance, it's going to be a long video. I thought about breaking it up into segments, but there's a lot of information here. But there's very important I get this out today and I want to introduce you to this person right here. Now, I struggle with when, if even to tell you who this is in relation to me. And I just want to be open as honest I can. This man is my grandfather. His name is James McIndo went to bottom. And he was a Colonel in the Air Force and that's all I knew about him. You see, he died in 1969. I was born in 1970. I was, my mom was a month pregnant with me when he passed away. And the only thing I ever knew about him growing up is that he was a Colonel in the Air Force and that he died in a plane crash. And that was about it. Did not know anything other than that. So I never required no one would say anything, you know, really. So the other day, about three weeks ago, that's when that all changed. I was talking to a family member who we've not really had much contact with the last time I seen them was 40 years ago and talked to them about maybe eight or nine years ago once briefly. So we ended up talking for some different reasons. And I brought up my grandfather and he, the gentleman I was talking to the family member says something very interesting when I mentioned my grandfather. And that all I knew that he was dying of plane crash. And he said, oh, yeah, your grandfather, well, they blew him out of the sky because he was going to rat out the government for their involvement in Vietnam. And I really, I didn't know what to do with that. It threw me for a loop. And, you know, our conversation ended and then hung up and I just kind of played what he said. And that sent me on this journey for the last three weeks. I put maybe 12, 14 hours of research, solid research into this. And I wanted to share with you guys what I have discovered because it was quite a fascinating journey. So this is my grandfather. And again, I apologize in advance for the information overload, if you will, there's going to be a lot. But, you know, this is a 50th anniversary of his death. And here we go. So my grandfather was in the Air Force. He was enlisted in 1939. Where is it right here? This has been date. December 1st, 1939. He died at July 6, like I said, 1969. And let's go here. This is his grave stone in Arlington National Cemetery. And I thought it was interesting that I didn't list Vietnam on here. I don't know why maybe they didn't do that during the current war. I don't know. But it's not here. I was in World War II in Korea. So before I get into what his job was in Vietnam, I wanted to set the show you what he did do up into that point. So I found some information what he did in World War II. He was involved in the 33rd Puris. That's photo book reconnaissance. He was always involved in some intelligence, some way shape or form. Here he is right here, James M. Winterbottom. He was an intelligence officer, unit store and unit sensor, public relations officer, plans and training officer in the 33rd PRS. And if you go to, let's close this out here. Also another thing in the 33rd PRS, I found him because he was a major and that other one in here looks like he was right here at the 360 third groups intelligence officer captain James M. Winterbottom used to be our intelligence officer. So now he's a captain. So World War II, he was I think he was in France and some other areas with this 33rd PRS group. So let's go back. All right. So then I couldn't find anything in the Korean War. Being involved in intelligence, hard to dig up information. But I found this information is very interesting. His job in 61 had a deal with the CIA. He was Air Force intelligence officer involved in meetings with CIA because he was involved in this committee on overhead reconnaissance. He was involved in two different programs, the Corona program and the, what's it called the San most programming me pull that up real quick. He was involved in these two right here. Project Corona. And if you look right here, Clinton, what he was president, son, executive or declassifying early satellite imagery. That's a whole other story. And so the release of more than 860,000 photos and he was involved in this Corona program. And also in this San most program that had to deal with, let's see the satellite missile observation system. So he was, he dealt heavily in a lot of these top secret organized are you know projects. And these meetings were about those projects and other things in relation to overhead reconnaissance and the photography that was related to those things. You see his name right here, Colonel Jane winner bottom present. This was minutes of a meeting held in room 429 at the atomic building at the central intelligence intelligence agency in September 61. And last meeting I could find minutes of was in December. So there's a lot of different CIA documents here relating to that that were declassified. Here's a letter written by James Winterbottom to chairman of the Haddock requirements committee, you know, about different things and they redacted some things. But so here's a letter he wrote that was declassified. All these are all minutes of meetings. This one here is one of him where he was absent of a meeting so they were making some statements in regards to that is another document I think written by Winterbottom my grandfather in regards to some middle of me also films 70 millimeter film. So you see was heavily involved in a lot of top secret stuff for regards to intelligence. This is the one about the San most satellite stuff where let's see here I've found it before. If you read through this Colonel winner bottom reported on an upcoming San most shots indicating that their primary purposes are in the however he said that the Air Force now preparing a draft paper submission. So he's he's involved heavily in a lot of this stuff. Here he is right here in the minutes of the meeting. All right, so that's 61 62 you got all these CIA documents with him present at these meetings here some of the names are read you know sanitize if you will. This one is May 61 so it's last meeting that I could find was December. So I was wondering what he did in 62 because that was in 61 and so let I there's a lot of information here and I struggle with how to present it all. So if it seems a little disjointed I apologize I wanted to take a little more time but I really wanted to get this out on his 50th anniversary you know why it's really. So anyway in the in Vietnam and I'm going to read some of this is the official history store historical release of what took place in Vietnam 62 to 67 with the MACV and I'm going to read it a little bit because it kind of gives you a little bit of history of it. But this is the sanitize versus the version of history they want us to know okay and 62 to 67 very important years and you're going to see why what was taking place in 62 to 62 to 67. So let's just read a little bit so you get a little history of what the MACV is. Okay, let's read the forward. Oops, started. Come on. I'm trying to enlarge this here. Okay, MACV the joint command in the years of exescalation in 62 to 67 is the first of two volumes that examine the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. This is the story of the military assistance command Vietnam and MACV from its establishment in February 1962 to the climax of American escalation at the end of 1967 it deals with the theater level command relationship strategy and operations and supplements detailed studies in the center of military history is United States Army and Vietnam series covering cover operations. MACV the joint command recounts how the MACV commander and his staff viewed the war at various periods and how and why they arrived at their decisions. It analyzes the intersected inter service politics of organizing and managing a joint command. MACV's relationships with Pacific command the joint chiefs of staff and the secretary of defense and the evolution of the command dealings with its South Vietnamese in third country allies perhaps most important. It traces the commander's role in developing and executing us policy in Vietnam a role that extended beyond military operations to encompass diplomacy and pacification as an experiment not entirely successful in nation building a story of the military assistance command contains many parallels to more recent army engagements and so serves as a potential source of important lessons. Let's go down a little bit to the preface because this will give us a little bit more detail when we can read all of it but MACV the joint command in the years of escalation describes the evolution of the command during the period of gradual expansion of the American effort in South Vietnam from its establishment in February 1962 as a small temporary organization to administer an assistance program. The military assistance command Vietnam grew by late 1967 into a large permanent headquarters that directed more than half a million American soldiers sailors, airmen and Marines in a wide range of combat and pacification operations. This volume tells a story of MACV's development as an organization and of the command's role in making and implementing American national policy in Southeast Asia. Remember that hence it treats both national level decisions and military operations from the perspective of the theater joint commander in relation to the United States Army and Vietnam series this volume and its sequel dealing with the later period of the conflict will provide a general overview and aspects of the war. Let's go back to MACV. Let's go back to MACV. MACV is a member of the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and the United States Army and we've been in Vietnam since we were there in 1954 and France was there before that and then we came in in in in in in in in in in in in just escalated from there and then they they created the MACV in 1962 and they appointed this guy named Harkins as the general and General Taylor, who was in the joint chiefs of staff, who was an appointment of Kennedy. Appointed, got MacDomerado Point Harkins as the commander of the MACB. So he's heavily mentioned in this document, but probably only him. They don't mention a lot of his staff, and I find that interesting. If you look right here, the only mention in Vietnam of my grandfather, because you can see, this is the official document, and this is in there, matter of fact, I can show you instead of just showing you like this. If I open this document back up, and I type it, winter bottom, there we go. His name is right here, mentioned on this chart. This is a chart referring to him as an ACSJ2. And this is a 500 page document, and the only time they refer to him is the J2 right here. I think only, let's see, the J2 is mentioned, but he's only mentioned as J2 in all these instances. You have J2 mentioned here instead of his name. So he's mentioned in here, but not by name. J2, winter bottom, page 52. Right here, South Vietnam, from which to draw the MACJ2, concentrated on providing technical advice. So let's see, the MACB headquartering the intelligence J2 section. So they really don't mention him by name in this document. I thought that was very interesting. It referred to him as J2. And remember, this is the sanitized version. I got some more documents here that were from here, that we'll look at maybe a little bit to show you the difference between the sanitized version. But look at this, this is a screenshot that I took. This is the MACV. I believe this is him right here. It's kind of fuzzy, but this is probably him, based on looking at this photo. And I couldn't get the whole thing in. So this is the MACV staff members, and it doesn't list their names, but I believe that's him right there. It could be wrong though. So let's look at a couple more things. Here's another screenshot I captured. I remember when I mentioned Harkins and Taylor. And we're gonna really go into these guys in detail here in a little bit. So in February, 62, Harkins on Taylor's recommendation set up a joint evaluation center under Winterbottom and an effort to craft more authoritative intelligence assessments in the situation. So the JEC was stationed at the embassy in Saigon. And Winterbottom was ahead of the JEC. So we're gonna get into what his role is there in more detail. Down here is what we're really gonna get into. This PhD thesis is fascinating. With a lot of the documents that police this fellow researched over 60,000 documents and put together this thesis as a PhD in about Vietnam. And it basically covers what a lot of the stuff I have up here that I'm gonna briefly touch on. This one, this one, here's about, in this here is about five or six books that Winterbottom has mentioned in, that we won't go in a whole lot of detail because the other one's gonna cover a lot of it. But you see here, Winterbottom, this book is called Monument to the Seat, Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars. And it talks about Winterbottom here, had given McNamara. So you see here a major connection. Winterbottom, had given McNamara, and McNamara is Kennedy's Secretary of Defense. So Winterbottom was reporting directly to McNamara. So here you have Winterbottom mentioned on several different pages in this book. The new head of US military intelligence in South Vietnam was Air Force Colonel James Winterbottom. Winterbottom answered that number of full-time Vietnam cons. So we're gonna get into what his job was there. I just want you to see that he's mentioned in all these books over here. There's another screen capture of a monument to the Seat. He's mentioned this guy, Blasig right here, was we're gonna get into what Blasig was just briefly. He's mentioned in these books here, Blasig here. Blasig remembered and asked me questions that I was advertised as a guy who had his feet on the gun of Vietnam. In fact, Blasig had been Colonel Winterbottom's gun carrier in Vietnam and had seen the corrupting of intelligence firsthand. So we're gonna get into what's going on, what he means by corrupting intelligence there. Blasig's a key player here. Now Blasig, let me get into this really quick about Blasig. Let me close this out. Let's go over here real quick. Okay, Blasig, he's in this court case here. Now this court case was very interesting. Remember I mentioned 62 to 67, was a very crucial time in Vietnam. 62 to 67, the Kennedy wanted out of Vietnam. He thought we were doing poorly and there was a push to report lower numbers of insurgents. They called them battle borders. Their job was to find out what they were coming up against and that was basically Winterbottom's job was to report those battle-ordered numbers. I'm running into that. But this court case after Harkins was there, Westmore than General Westmore was put in place there at 64 and he kept the same job going all over to 67 and reporting lower numbers. So CBS did a story on it and Westmore than didn't like it ensued at CBS for defamation of character in 1982. 1982, this is in 1985 and Blasig was called a testify. And he mentions, because they talk about what his role was there. And here he mentions, and that capacity I traveled extensively with the new, or the then J2, MACV, and Air Force Colonel, named Colonel James Winterbottom. So you see he's mentioned in that court case as being there in Baldwin and Vietnam. Let's go back to the books, because I want to show you guys a couple more here. Here's a book here in the middle of the room. Here's a book here called, our Vietnam, the war of 54 to 75. Winterbottom is mentioned here. Remember the word name Allen, because there's gonna be some interesting things regarding Allen and Winterbottom. Winterbottom, prepare to map in McNamara, requested a map for Winterbottom to prepare about the battle of water numbers, and it was overlaid with all these different red and blue. And this is very interesting. Let me read this, because it'll come clear later, Winterbottom had prepared the sort of map McNamara and specified in Honolulu. Six feet high, three feet wide, showed all of South Vietnam up to the demilitarized zone. Red acetate overlays with blue stripes represented the areas controlled by the Vietnam Khan. Blue overlays into KVN areas controlled by the GVN, the government of Vietnam. The two other categories were plain red for VC and ascended, ascendancy, yellow for GVN and ascendancy. So much red dotted the map that Harkin staff called it the Miso map. But it was not shown to Harkin's himself until the night before McNamara was due to land. And at a rehearsal of his briefing, Harkin's was appalled that, oh my god, he said, we're not showing that to McNamara. And with Harkin supervising, Winterbottom peeled off red, ascitated until he'd removed about one third of the enemy controlled areas. So we're gonna get into what that means, what was going on there. But here's another book that Winterbottom has mentioned in. And these are several different screen captures of excerpts from that book, where Winterbottom is mentioned in Harkins and McNamara. And a lot of the shenanigans that were going on there, which we are gonna cover. Let's see, let me open a couple of these and just show you. Here we got Winterbottom mentioned, Winterbottom struggled to meet his deadline. The pressure we gonna tell. I have a screen capture of this too. The speaker's character a little bit maybe. At a Saigon officer's clovey fought with a deputy and knocked him down. And he was almost sent back to the US when he finaled that General's wife at a party. That's an interesting information. As the date of McNamara's tour grew closer, Winterbottom began to pace his estimate of enemy casualties on his intuition. Here we go. Winterbottom took Alan and another civilian off the project. So let's see, Winterbottom's erratic behavior. So, and then let's do this one here. Here we go again. Harkins was counting on his chief of intelligence, Air Force Colonel James Winterbottom, who had already been exposed to McNamara's statistical ferocity. So here he is, he's having direct dealings with McNamara, the Secretary of Defense. Here, let's see, let's go look at another couple more books. That was Arviet Nam, a bright shining lie, a whole. He's mentioned quite a bit in this book. Again, Harkins, you have your same characters. You have Winterbottom being mentioned. I think I saved this one because he's down here towards the bottom, because I couldn't get it all in. Let's go, and this one here. There we go. Winterbottom reported honestly on Vance February 8th. So Winterbottom told the Commanding General and Staff Conference is all that true. So here he is mentioning again another book. And again, I don't want to really get too much into these books because I have a better resource coming for what happened. Here's some more. Winterbottom reported. Here we go. Here Winterbottom brought it back to Saigon. Let's see, there were some hiding reports when the bottom's tripped. Here we go. Winterbottom is mentioned in several different pages here in this book. This book is a bright shining lie, John Paul Van and American Vietnam. Let's see here. We got this one. You know, more, I mean, the whole history of Vietnam is fascinating. I've read too so much about DM and how he's machine gunned down and all that stuff. But that I can get in so many different veins on this on this. But I'm trying to stay focused because there's so much information that people just don't know. Again, here we go. Good to bottoms down here. He's mentioned a few times. I just screen captured these to show that he's in a lot of these books. The lie Winterbottom had done months before. The scammers repeated up the chain and inflated the success that was claimed. So you're getting a little, you know, hints as to what's going on. There is a lot of information I've been on out of the way. I think you're going to have to easily keep that. In general, the possibility of stream breaking over to this book. This is distributed that is dose 123. It started to show. Suddenly real fast. And we see each other day. I'm saying I use the platform to reír and I. Is it not often seen here? But you know, I just don't know the full story that's why I'm doing all this research. So he's mentioning all these different books here. So let's go look at another one before we get to some other stuff here. This, I think this is one more book that he's mentioning, Paradox and National Security is another book. Paradox for National Security Complex, House Secrecy and Security. He's mentioned also here, the CIN, the Defense Department ever since it had been made clear that County was not enthralled with the situation of Vietnam. I decided to encourage him by providing false intelligence that indicated that the SVN was making progress against the Viet Cong Air Force Colonel James Winterbottom. I don't know where the junior comes from. That might have been a typo. I did a doctor statistics to the White House after consulting with General Harkins. The real, this is where it gets interesting. The real intelligence that accurately assessed the situation was sent to Vice President Johnson and a special assistant Colonel. Burris Johnson was chosen to receive this unsengined intelligence. Very interesting things going on here in the background of what's happening. Again, I don't want to get into it yet. We're going to get into it here soon. That's a lot of the books that Winterbottom is mentioning in regards to Vietnam. We have another following we'll work here called the Vietnam Cauldron, the Feds Intelligence and the War for Southeast Asia. This is the Defense Intelligence Agency, Historical Research Division. Again, it's more sanitized stuff, but let's type in Winterbottom and see what we get. He's on, looks like three pages, four pages. He's mentioned here on page seven. The MACVs intelligence chief was Air Force Colonel James. Winterbottom, a specialist in strategic reconnaissance and a man with little understanding of insurgencies. That's what kind of threw me off to, you know, 6061. He was a specialist in strategic reconnaissance. There's some other things that talk about, you know, he was involved in post-nuclear photo reconnaissance and things of that nature. A friend to be thrown in this situation was very interesting. You know, it seems like an interesting twist. In February 1962, Harkins on Taylor's recommendation said we'll join the evaluation center. We kind of read this already on your Winterbottom that effort to craft more authoritative intelligence. He's again mentioned on page 10. His memo directly contradicted the sanguine intelligence reports emergency from Winterbottom's office in MACV, noting that the communist capability to extend, okay, so he's mentioned here. This is the official historical. You know, he's mentioned back in here in the, whatever you call that, the back there. So this is what I've been leading up to, this document right here. This is a fascinating document. And I went down to page 97. This is, this is someone did their doctoral thesis on what's going on in Vietnam. And he, like I said, he researched through 60,000 pages or more of a paperwork to produce this. And it's, if you want to, and I'll post links for this kind of stuff, but it's very good stuff. Now, let me give you the, before I read this, let me give you the chain of what's going on here. You got the DIA defense intelligence agency. And they're going to talk about them. They're going to talk about all the key players. So you got, remember, you got Macdomerra, who's Kennedy's secretary of defense. You got General Taylor, who was in the joint chief staff of staffs. You got Lyndon Johnson was mentioned. But you have all these key players that want to stay in the war, but you got Kennedy wanting out of the war or wanting to pull out. And they need to stay in the war so they have to mess with the numbers. They have to mess with the numbers. And when you read this, you're going to see the role that my grandfather played in that Shred. So let's start here. And I apologize. I'm going to do a lot of reading here, but this is, is very fascinating. All right. So let's start right here. The DIA was enjoying to coordinate the OB. Now, remember, the OB is order of battle. The order of battle effort. So order battle is compiling. Oh, it's going to talk right here. Prior to that time, the agency was only largely involved in compiling the order of battle. The routine assessments were normally coordinated by the J2 and produced by analysts at the military assistance and advisory group, the MAAG. They were there from 55 basically to 62. So the military assistance advisory group, precursor to the MACV, this change in February 62, that month, Mac and Mara called a conference. I'm going to start moving this mass around. A conference of the military establishment at CINCPAC headquarters at Camp Smith, Honolulu to assess the state of the conflict in South Vietnam. This was the third of eight conferences that the Secretary of Defense held on the Vietnam conflict during the Kennedy administration. The general consensus among officials and attendants was that the world was going badly. The participants were aware that an SNIE was being prepared in Washington that confirmed this pessimism. Derriere from field intelligence reports the estimate concluded that despite the augmentation of the South Vietnamese counter-issurgency program, the rebellion continued to prosper via the conferences had effectively doubled the last six months. February 19th February, the conference participants were briefed by the new MACV commander General Paul Harkins and his intelligence chief, Colonel James Winterbottom, to the surprise of all Harkins stated that he was optimistic about prospects for success in Vietnam and the near future. Mac and Mara was astonished by this judgment for it, directly contrasted the SNIE. Question, MACV intelligence chief, Colonel Winterbottom closely inquiring as to what specific factors provided the basis for such optimism. The Secretary noted that MACV's own estimate of the Vietnam order in Dao Zoub, had increased, presumably the strength of the insurgent was growing. Was this not contrary to the expressed optimism he asked? What happened to the VC in July 1961? They reported that the strength of 12,300 in December, 17,000 in January, 20 to 25,000. And the increase of we've been miscounting. Winterbottom's response was evasive. He offered the Secretary a range of 18,500 to 27,000 B.A. con and failed to intelligibly explain the methodology which yielded these figures. Mac and Mara was not satisfied in pressure. Oh, I'm sorry, and pressed the issue. Ambassador Nolting and the chairman of the JCS, you know, LEM, or even that yet, LEM Nitzer joined the fray. The former argued that the MACV figures were too low and the latter contended that they were too high. The discussion became heated. Admiral felt tried to end the argument that Mac and Mara resisted remarking, if we don't have a firm OB today, that's order of battles. The Kennedy administration will be unable to determine what the changes have been. In effect, the Secretary asserted that as long as the OB remain indeterminate, the progress of the work cannot be evaluated. Mac and Mara angrily stated that he wanted a punitive punitive punitive punitive, punitive OB as soon as possible. And to this end, he instructed the military to provide his office with a specific statement of the intelligence resources required to execute this order as a matter top priority. He concluded that this intelligence problem must be solved. The military intelligence community scrambled to fulfill this directive. The collection processing analysis of intelligence pertinent to the OB was a formidable task. Intelligence employed was derived from this desperate, disparate sources provided by elements of the NSA CIA State Department. The UNS commands and military services the systematic processing and evaluation of this information was truly an interdepartmental effort requiring meticulous coordination in a certain manner. As a matter of common concern, the task appears tailor made for the DIA. The agency was created precisely to do with intelligence matters that transcended the competence of a single military agency or element. The OB order battles certainly meant this criterion. Moreover, at heart, the OB was a strategic intelligent estimate, because it was employed by administration officials to form a policy and military plans at national and international levels. The intelligence literature recognized the OB as strategic intelligence. And since the DIA was not only responsible for coordinating military contributions to strategic intelligence estimates, one would expect the OB to fall under the purview of the agency's estimate office. However, the agency's jurisdiction in this matter was disputed. MACV asserted that the OB was not strategic but tactical intelligence. And therefore, strategic and tactical intelligence, the distinction is derived from the level of application. Strategic intelligence is that intelligence employed by national policy makers. Tactical is used by field commanders. The OB order battles was utilized by both sets of consumers for different purposes. The DIA and MACV both had legitimate jurisdictional claims regarding it. Although many disinterested intelligence analysts judged the merits of the DIA claim to be greater, curiously, the DIA did not press the matter and aced it to the request of the military command in Saigon to assume responsibility for the Viet Cong OB order battle. It was an unusual move several explanations have been offered. The most persuasive is that MACV's proximity to the conflict allowed to exploit raw intelligence more efficiently and rapidly offering greater responsiveness to challenging intelligence requirements from Saigon and Washington. In respect of the merits of the argument, it is remarked that Carol sacrificed the organizational interest of the DIA to play cake a field commander. Analysts at the DIA feared that the OB process would be corrupted by the operational requirements of MACV, the sphere proved to be valid. MACV's extrotation, this intelligence problem must be solved was resolved not in Washington but in Saigon. MACV OB and Denver was centered in the newly established joint evaluation center, JEC, an interagency all source intelligence organization. The JEC was intended to supplement MACV intelligence from viding congruent estimate intelligence. The center was assigned personnel from MACV, CIA and the State Department in an attempt to moderate institutional bias. The subjective was reinforced by the fact that the JEC was directed by the American ambassador rather than the COMUSMACV and was physically located in the embassy in Saigon. In late February, now remember the JEC was run by winter bottom. In late February, the DIA sent its premier OB analyst George Allen to Saigon to assist MACV and the JEC in compiling the Viet Cong OB. At the time, Allen was serving as a cementing consultant to the director of DIA's CIA. CIC Allen was an indoor China specialist, a former Army officer with several tours of duty in the region. He had personally witnessed the futile French effort to tame the Vietnam men in the 1950s and was therefore inclined to view American involvement in Vietnam with a sense of historical skepticism. He ran the Saigon several days after the third Secretary of Defense conference to receive a rude reception. When he reported to the MACV's intelligence chief Colonel Winterbottom, he found the Colonel in a foul mood, and modishing a subordinate for failing to allow Winterbottom to review communications between the officer and his superior in Washington, although such a review was clearly a violation military protocol. Let's go back down here. Here we go. This is Allen speaking here. He, Winterbottom, then turned to me and mixing strong verbal and exploitive in his heated remarks told me in no uncertain terms that though I might have been hot shot big time, powerful blanket, I think GS-15 back in Washington, out there in Saigon I was no better than the lowest ranked private. I would enjoy no special privileges that I should remember for whom I was working, and that I was not DAI's employee but his and that I, if I tried to communicate with my home office without clearing any message with him, he would fix my wagon to put a politely. Allen, the lone representative of the DAI in Saigon joined a small team of a dozen military officers who were responsible for conviling the OB or a battle. The team performed five weeks of arduous research gathering dead on the vehicle military apparatus from field trips, combat unit intelligence reports, single intercepts, capture documents, interviews with prisoners, and by April the team had collected enough evidence to begin a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the information. The team subsequently developed a strict criterion for confirming reported vehicle units and a rigorous methodology for evaluating the size, composition, and strength of the unit. The strict criterion was intentional, the team wanted to produce a sober, if conservative, assessment of how many strength. Throughout the assessment the OB team clashed with winter bottom. Several members later asserted that winter bottom appeared unable to understand complexities of formulating an accurate OB, a few accused him of professional competence, a serious charge not capriciously made. Nearly all team members reported the J2 that's winter bottom repeatedly attempted to subvert cable traffic between them and their commanders at CIN, CPC, and in Washington. These do not appear to have been isolated in currencies, but illustrations of winter bottoms, modus operandi, which disregarded common operating configurations and procedures. Normally the intelligence need to and operations G3 divisions are kept separate in the command component to insulate intelligence from operational bias. However, in Saigon J2, winter bottom allowed operation officers to edit intelligence reports prior to submission. The conflict of interest is manifest. The implementers of orders were allowed to evaluate their own performance. All pretense to objectivity was disregarded. It was a dangerous president which would lead to disastrous consequences. Why did winter bottom exercise such control over the intelligence section? Two motives seemed to be likely. The first was simple organizational self-interest. Strict control allowed winter bottom to limit the dissemination of pessimistic intelligence, which would contradict official MACV claims of progress. Bleak intelligence might have been interrupted detrimentally to the command in Washington and created misgivings concerning the performance of the U.S. military advisory team. All things considered optimistic intelligence was more likely to preserve the autonomy and authority of military commanders in Saigon than pessimistic intelligence, therefore was preferred and encouraged. Second motive was political, since early March Kennedy, intimate and ambassador to India and the United John Kenneth Galbraith had been urging the president to seek a neutralist political solution to the conflict in Vietnam. Galbraith thought the provoking cables caught and held the interest of the president. For the question of the very foundation of American involvement in Indochina, for example, in the 2nd of March, 1962, Galbraith wrote Kennedy, incidentally, who is the man in your administration who decides what countries are strategic. I would like to have his name and address and ask him what is so important about this real estate and the space age. What strength do we gain from alliance with the incompetent government and the people who are largely indifferent to their own salvation? Excuse me. On April 1, Galbraith met personally with the president to advocate a political compromise for a Vietnam. Traditionally, the JCS Joint Chief Staff were vehemently opposed to the proposal and condemned it as naive and inept. Nevertheless, Kennedy appeared to seriously consider the Galbraith proposal, while the president contemplated the American military effort in Vietnam hung in the balance. Thus, April was a politically sensitive month for the military. The JCS Joint Chief Staff were at acutely aware that the bad news from Vietnam might influence the president to accept the Galbraith proposal. The president's military representative, General Maxwell Taylor, now remember we mentioned him already, concurred with the Joint Chief Staff that the present American policy in Vietnam should be pursued to a successful conclusion. Taylor possessed outstanding political intuition. He was well aware of the magnitude of the president's imminent decision and advised Harkins. Now remember, Taylor is the one who put Harkins as the head of MACB, so he advised Harkins of the delicate political dynamics in Washington through private-backed channel cables. It should be noted that Harkins was very much Taylor's man in the field, a trusted friend and confident, the pair formed a formidable team, Taylor and Leigh, with fine political and bureaucratic instincts, Harkins the assistant, the competent manager and team player, the relationship was tried and true. Previously, when Taylor was named the superintendent of West Point, Harkins was appointed the commandant of cadets. When Taylor took over the U.S. 8th Army of Korea, Harkins was appointed as chief staff. Fewer surprise that when McNamara was seeking a commander for the newly created MACB in February, Taylor recommended Harkins for the post, despite the fact that Harkins had no experiencing guerrilla warfare, his prowess lay in logistics. He was by all accounts very much the conventional general. Yet, he was appointed commander for a very truly unconventional war. Taylor orchestrated the appointment as he had in the past and Harkins was again grateful. He knew his role. Taylor wanted optimism from Vietnam and he and the JCS clearly did. It was probable that Harkins and his intelligence chief winner-bought-of-would provide it. In the middle of April, the Sagan team arrived at a new order battle figure by their consular announcement of the Vietcong Regan military units, main force and guerrilla total of approximately 40,000 men. This was a startling increase over the 25,000 figure presented to the Secretary of Defense eight weeks earlier. As the team prepared to submit the revised OB, it was informed through intermediaries that winner-bought-of-would not accept the statistics that the aggregate was too high. It was suggested that the team will lower the figures, although the new range desired by the intelligence chief was not made clear. In order to achieve this end after some thought, the team simply introduced a new classification category, possible units, to supplement the existing categories confirmed and probable. In short, the aggregate would now be divided into three, as opposed to two groups, one of which the possible category could be easily dismissed by MACV as unconfirmed, although in four military men knew better. And therefore, in consequential. The process was analogous to dividing a different card in the three portions rather than two, then discarding one portion. The total was reduced, not through superior methodology, but through bureaucratic side of hand. One participant, William Benedict recalled its provenance thus. George Allen and Lou Tix, with some way, we wanted a figure of 20,000 main force roughly speaking. As I recall, and so that's how we came up with a probable and possible unit feeling that a reasonable commander would look at this and say, okay, if there's 20,000 confirmed and 10,000 probable and 5,000 possible, why there's a hell of a lot of bad guys out there. No, Benedict's justification for the manipulation. A reasonable commander would not discount the species probable category. And include these units in his assessment and then he strength. Regrettably, few commanders proved to be reasonable by Benedict's definition. Despite the clever revision, the team again was a form that William Bottom would not accept the new figures. That the total was still too high. The team again re-worked the figures, shifting even more units into the possible category. Winter Bottom accepted the last modification on April 15th at MACV, endorsed the work of the OB team, and issued the official vehicle order of battle at 16,305. This illusion by the experienced George Allen informed Winter Bottom superior General Harkins that the OB figure was inaccurate and described the manipulation of the categories of detail. It appears that Harkins did not investigate this allegation. Allen claims that he later learned that the orders to reduce the OB originated from Harkins. Winter Bottom simply conveyed them. This various MACV OB was presented to McNamara and his staff at the fifth secretary of defense conference held in Saigon from the 8th to 11th May. The OB was employed by MACV offers to portray the Vietnam conflict and promising light Harkins expressed progress in virtually all areas of the war effort. Four of the analysts from the OB team present the conference later claimed that the briefings were intentionally misleading in the secretary and his staff were not presented. The defense was purposely misled on nearly all of the crucial aspects of the war, the size of the enemy, the number of quality of friendly operations, the territory controlled by the enemy versus territory controlled by friendly forces, the number of desertions from South Vietnam on forces, the success of the placement of US intelligence advisors, and the problems with the self-defense courts. The MACV was a watershed event in order of battle controversy. In the words of Captain Donald Blazik, you read about him before. An MACV analyst assigned to the OB team, this was when the big lie started. McNamara was not the reasonable commander when it had been an hoped for. By all accounts, the secretary was encouraged by MACV's optimism. He took detailed notes during the briefings and filing several notes, following the conference McNamara told the press, I've seen nothing but progress and hopeful indications of further progress in the future. Many journalists were surprised by the statement. Most had spent considerable time in South Vietnam and personally witnessed the mounting deterioration of the countryside. They ascribed as remark at odds with their experience to official propaganda. Later, Neil Shehan, the United Press, the international founder of South Aloneman, asked him off the record. What he really thought about the conflict he was applying is that he had revealed much about the secretary of defense soon to become the secretary of war. Every quantitative measurement we have shows that we are winning the war. For McNamara's statistics were a reality. If the MACV stated the number of enemy units was declining, then the military operations of South Vietnam and the United States were effective. America was prevailing. It was that simple. Following the fifth secretary of defense conference, the OB team was dissolved, responsibility for compiling and updating the Viet Cong OB was transferred to the MACV intelligence section. Though few realized at the time, Winterbottom won the struggle for authority over the enemy OB. It was an easy victory. The other intelligence agencies were largely indifferent to the matter. Carol was reported to have little interest in the OB. And with notable exception of Georgia Allen, the most work intent to let MACV directly effort thereafter the intelligence community generally deferred to MACV on OB intelligence and MACV intelligence assumed the new promise. It was now an important bureaucratic player not only in the theater, but in Washington. As the influence of MACV waxed the legitimacy of the JEC and with the promise of interdepartmental intelligence waned, the CIA and the State Department did not commit sufficient resources, both money and manpower to the center because they suspected that any intelligence produced was likely to be disregarded by MACV. If it contradicted the operational desires of the command without true support from the civilian intelligence agencies, the JAC attribute. It was eventually relocated from the MACV to MACV where it simply supplemented winter bottoms intelligence section. MACV's victory over its rivals was now complete. For the DIA, the OB matter was a neglected opportunity. A mischance to exert its authority and exercise its analytic ability, spurting leadership. The AAC was content to follow. Its growing inability to influence the course of events and Vietnam was illustrated by the Ordeal of George Allen. After leaving Saigon for Washington in May, Allen stopped at CINCPAC, intelligence in Honolulu. There he breathed Brigadier General Patterson on the manipulation of the order of battle. Patterson appeared sympathetic, but he, like Harkins, in the end, took no action against winter bottoms. Instead, Allen later discovered Patterson sent a back channel message to both MACV and the Air Force intelligence in Washington. Morning, Allen was out to get winter bottoms. When Allen arrived in Washington, he was informed that General Kara wanted to meet with him immediately and aware of the back channel cable that preceded him. Allen breathed the director of the DIA. Kara was the director of DIA. And his aides candidly, he recounts, I begin, after taking a deep breath with the suggestion that the J2 winter bottom be replaced. Again, outlining his unsuitability for the assignment. General Kara asked what service the J2 belonged to. When I replied that he was an Air Force colonel, the general flushed, but then continued questioning him on other matters for another 15 minutes. So finally, thanked me and dismissed me and opted to door closed behind me. The General asked the assembled colonels and the Brigadier generals who the hell that civilian thought he was to call the judgment, the confidence of an Air Force colonel. Let's see, it is interesting to compare Allen's return with that of another OB team member, William Benedict. When Benedict returned to Washington, he reported to his superior, General Fitch. He recalled, I went in and I told Fitch what the story was, how they manipulate the figures. You know, the pressure we had to hold the point down, he tried to call the Army Chief of Staff, but that was just at the time when Decker was checking out of the net and wasn't able. So what happened is Fitch sent me over to the National Board of Estimates. I went over to him, I talked to these guys, where I leveled them and they all said, hey, this mission is confirmed, but what are you going to do by then the whole thing and reach the point where it was a political implication overpowering us. Let's see here, Carol's reaction is significant for it to close. Discloses the tacit belief of many senior officers that only military men are competent to assess the performance of their peers in spite of Allen's military background and expertise in the region. He was still a civilian and therefore not qualified to criticize Winter Mod. He was a curious but by no means unique event, the director, excuse me, the director of DIA dismissed the judgment of the agency's preeminent indo-China specialists in deference to a military colonel with little experience in the region and little understanding of real warfare simply because the colonel and the general were the same color uniform. Service loyalty came first and the integrity of the intelligence process and the organizational interests of the DIA at this second and third. Nonetheless, Allen's outspoken views on the OB-matter steered controversy in Washington and finally compelled Carol to take action. In June, the director of the DIA announced that he would personally investigate Allen's allegations of manipulation. Carol saw the team of analysis to assist him in departed Washington for a second and the effort was for not. Allen recalls the win was taken on of Carol's sales when he made the required courtesy call to CIN, CPC and Honolulu and route to Segon. Allen will felt chose to remind General Carol that Vietnam was on CIN's CPC's turf and that as the theater commander, he was responsible for intelligence of Vietnam and that he reported directly to the joint chiefs that DIA was not in his chain of command and therefore had no authority over intelligence in Admiral Felt's theater and that he trusted General Carol understood this and would conduct himself accordingly General Carol and vice-staffed when they returned to their plane that they would not conduct a review of intelligence in Vietnam but would simply be making an orientation visit to familiarize themselves with the situation and that's what he and his staff did. Thus the authority of the DIA over the U of S commands was revealing to be a chimera. Thankfully Carol was never asked to count for his trip. Again I'm sorry for all this reading but it's only a couple more pages I'm going to go over because it's pertinent. Washington was soon consumed by the Cuban Miss Christ however they did Carol was contacted by Walt Rostow to confirm a rumor that senior DIA analysts recently returned from Vietnam with critical views of the war effort. Rostow was of course referring to George Allen. Carol confirmed the rumor and give a surprise Rostow asked interview the analyst at the time. Rostow was a counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council as such he was heavily involved in strategic planning for Vietnam and was an influential advisor to the principal policy makers Alan recounts this request caused quite a stir throughout the IA which finally agreed to Rostow's request provided that he come to the Pentagon for the briefing. He was also inside the IA General Officer and Air Force Brigadier should attend the briefing session as moderator. I was warned to refrain from criticizing MACV's intelligence competence while I could offer my own views of the enemy situation I would not do it in ways that might suggest any shortcomings in MACV's intelligence effort. Thus criticism of the MACV intelligent effort which might have been constructing with this early stage of American involvement was proscribed. As William Perry observes the unwritten code military conduct it takes that while unquestioning loyalty when servicing commander is not a requirement criticizing when servicing commander to others especially those in other services is absolutely forbidden. Carol ensured that the DIA followed this code even if it meant that he had to censor his own an analyst. Of course the other military and military intelligence agencies abide by the code and refrain from critiquing the reports of winter bottom and his staff. The result was that MACV intelligence quickly became fallible and few dared to challenge its reporting. Disapplied not only to other intelligent organizations but to internal dissenters. The experience of Captain James Harris is illustrated in late July 1962. Harris a former member of the OB team and now assigned to MACV intelligence completed a study of the communist and searching that concluded that the iconic string was probably on the rise as a result of increased infiltration from North Vietnam. The study was widely disseminated and immediately praised by the CINC PAC and Army element ARPAC in particular as a seminal analysis based on high reliable intelligence sources. Nevertheless MACV rejected the Harris study, repudiating the work of its own analyst. In fact MACV properly released a contradictory assessment based on ambiguous evidence and dubious analysis and officially reduced the estimate of the infiltration from the previous month from 800,000 men in June to 500 to 600 in July. Those who questioned the doctrine of optimism were swiftly spurred by the command. Progress was the creed of MACV puritanical canon that provided no dissent. Nonetheless, heretics lurked on the steps of the temple. It's spring in 1962 and television reports produced by the intelligence section of ARPAC. Derived from the same raw intelligence that MACV employed were consistently cynical about the prospects for the success of the counter-insurgency campaign. The historian John Newman explains disparity thus MACV tended to utilize only intelligence which demonstrated progress in its analysis and ignored contradictory information. The ARPAC objectively assessed intelligence to arrive at its pessimistic conclusions. Newman concluded that ARPAC performed honest intelligence analysis rigors and objective while MACV produced misleading intelligence in support of the wishes of its commanders. It is remarkable that this early stage of conflict the Army intelligence which presumably was proficient in accurate assessing comment operations was skeptical on the war effort while MACV intelligence directed by an Air Force Colonel with no experiencing real warfare exuded confidence. Okay, let's see, I only got a little bit more here. It made Brigadier General WB Rosen, the Special Assistance Army Chief Staff General George Decker personally tried to be an omnivacist at the State of the Conflict. His final report was later with Gloom. At every region that he visited from the highlands to the Delta he found near universal skepticism among the American advisors that the VIECOM could be swiftly defeated. The Army Staff ignored the report. There was too unwilling to challenge the judgment of MACV to doubt the creative progress. Descent was rare, optimism was the established faith and the Secretary of Defense was a true believer. At the Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference on 23rd of July 1962, MACV presented McNamara with an OBS to which indicated that there was no significant change in the strike. The Secretary interpreted this to be a validation of the effectiveness of the existing American policies. In fact, the Secretary of Defense so enthusiastic about progress of the war based on MACV intelligence that he ordered the JCS, Joint Chief Staff, formerly a witch wall plan for American forces. DIA analysts believed that the Secretary was overly optimistic. Several suspected OB was static because MACV was again altering the criteria to show no change. When DIA analysts in the CIC serve ticiously queried several fraternal MACV intelligence officers about the inner OB, they received a serving response that the MACV intelligence officers believed that the evidence compiled prior to the conference clearly indicated that the Vietcong OB should be increasing, not decreasing. Aware that winter bottom would not be receptive to this information, they circumvented the intelligence chief and presented the evidence and the negative assessment to Harkins. After reviewing the intelligence provided by staff, Harkins rejected an increase in the enemy OB based not on a contract with your evidence or discrete analysis, but on his intuitive belief that the allied operations must be taking a toll on the Vietcong. This discovery shocked even a disillusioned George Allen at DIA. He was astonished that a field commander subjective views could lead to the suppression of Harkins intelligence, amounting enemy capabilities. Nonetheless, it had occurred. It was not the first time. It was not the first time. Yeah, 2000 there. Nor would it be the last. Once again, the DIA Command staff did not allow its analyst to challenge the OB issued by MACV. Additionally, they did not inform McNamara of the disparity of judgment within the defense until it was community over the Vietcong OB, the secretary mistakenly believed that the Espinox agencies were in accord. Here, the DIA clearly failed to fulfill its responsibilities to the secretary of defense. McNamara should have been advised of the disagreements over the order battles, order battle, and provided with an independent DIA assessment. Carol did not allow the agency analyst to do this, and so failed the secretary. His service lodges came first, and so he acquiesced to the wishes of the field commanders. By doing this, Carol removed the DIA from one of the crucial issues of the Vietnam conflict. The exile was largely self-imposed. The director never truly confronted the military establishment. Over the matter, and never pressed his authority through silence and inaction, the DIA abdicated its strategic responsibility for order battle intelligence. The apathy of Carol this matter has never been explained satisfactorily. Seven DIA officials have suggested the director of the DIA believe that the OB was a prerogative of MACV, and that the proper role of the DIA was one of support. This view is understandable despite the fact that there was good reason for OB to be considered a strategic intelligence estimate, and therefore fall under the purview of the DIA. What is difficult to understand however why Carol subsequently let MACV dominate the issue to the point of the virtual exclusion of his own agency. As a defense intelligence agency serving the secretary of defense, Carol and his staffman have certainly had the right. Some would say the responsibility challenge will be assessments from Saigon inconsistent with the DIA intelligence, yet Carol tacit tacit tacit tacitly, some like that. Discourage these challenges in the summer of 1962 a year later you would explicitly forbid that Carol always prevent did not wish to rock the boat. Thus the DIA did not simply acquiesce the MACV or battle intelligence it capitulating. I think I'm almost there. Let's just read a little more. On 26 March 1962, a mid-growing congressional fears over centralization within the defense department. The House represented an armed service committee created a special subcommittee of defense agencies which held hearings to acquire into agencies that have been created or were being contemplated by the OSD. The inquiry focused on NSA DCA DIA and the defense supply and see that it was later established on November 6, 1961 by MACV. It's a coordinated military supply and service functions traditionally. The House armed service committee had been a strong supporter. A military service is opposed merger of the departments or the creation of a general staff critical of civilian encroachment in military realms. The hearings were called because the armed service committee was concerned that the increasing centralization of military function under the jurisdiction of OSD was moving the defense department toward a single defense concept and idea which the majority of members were diametrically opposed to. MACV is derived to consolidate defense intelligence in the winter of 1662 highlighted that apprehension of the powerful representatives consequently they moved to investigate. So you see MACV created the DIA to try to put them all in umbrella. But yeah. So I think you're getting a good picture here of Winterbond's role in all of this and I think I can stop there. It's just a fascinating document I read through so much of this. Again let me go to the beginning and say it's a doctoral thesis if you guys I can put links to it if I can get there fast enough. There we go. Let's see here the functional command the defense so this is a fascinating fascinating piece of literature. It's a PhD thesis Vietnam from Vietnam anyway. So now that I went through all that oh gosh I read so much and I don't even know where to jump out at here. So you see all the players you see everything is going on and for what I can gather from the information I found Winterbond was there in 1662 and 63. His role there was to report lower numbers than any cost. You know you had the joint chiefs of staff. You had Taylor. You had the general Taylor who was with the joint chiefs of staff. You have Lyndon Johnson in the background there and many others in Johnson's cat are not Johnson but in Kennedy's cabinet and in the military advisory roles under Kennedy wanted to stay in the war. Kennedy was considering pulling out of Vietnam and they had this big man pushed to stay there and now the reason was you know to squash the efforts of communism to overtake they said they couldn't let that happen and they pushed Winterbond. Winterbond was the man that was involved in reporting those numbers. Now what was so important about that from 62 to 67 I think Winterbond was at 63 they pulled him out at 64 because they took Harkins out and put Westmore than him and you saw that court case right here that I talked about that Westmore than was there from 64 to 67 and he was doing the same thing. He was reporting lower numbers and you got to wonder why they impetus to stay in Vietnam. What was the big what was the big drive to stand Vietnam and and I knew a little bit about that but I've been doing some research here and well you'll be surprised this is I've read several other articles too and there's some several links but it's all comes down to drugs you know if you read this article or your army's addicts and spooks the CIMV and I'm a lous. This is such a fascinating document there was so much drugs heroin grade four heroin was being made out of lous being funneled to Vietnam and you know some crazy numbers. Did you know how much money the military the military soldiers in Vietnam the US soldiers were spending upwards of 80 million dollars a year on heroin they said that some reports were 30% of the military men in Vietnam were addicted to heroin they were selling heroin in Vietnam and the higher the upper class in Vietnam. The heroin was being sold it was being transported all over the country into the US and it was all being done by C the CIA controlled it all that if you read through this they had four um gotta go back I'll put a link to this but they had four heroin labs in lous and Vietnam and they were all connected right next door to CIA headquarters that were there in the area and run by CIA officials they were their planes were CIA just fascinating stuff and it's a billion dollar industry back then even 60 to 70% of the world's heroin that was being produced was coming out of southeastern in this uh asia and southeastern from lous Vietnam a couple of other surrounding countries so that was one you know one of the impetus is staying the war of course always you know you've got when you're in war you're spending money on resources mud mud metal tanks you know they're making money on both sides of the war obviously that's what they do so I don't know why it's doing this there we go so that's one um one reason we wanted to stay in the war fascinating stuff and if you remember what happened in 68 the Tet Offensive when they came in the vietcong in north vietnam they had some pretty big successes there coming in and a lot of our men died in the Tet Offensive and that was in 68 and if you were a man like winter bottom in that position to report those numbers lotus you stay in that war and then you know I think by 68 you know at 66 he was he wasn't in vietnam anymore I found this this is a news report from 1966 September um the commander is a ten conference and he's listed in here jame conno james winter bottom also from tarq tarq is tactical air command in a shawir force base he was the director of intelligence over there I found that out so in 66 he was out of vietnam and he was back in the states but in 68 with the Tet Offensive and you know I'm thinking that winter bottom my grandfather could have grew and started growing a conscience and you know his role was no light matter in what happene