China Strategic Military Power Maritime Aviation Airlift & Naval Power (Military Analysis)

Video Transcript:

The Chinese government has achieved a great deal in terms of modernizing and increasing the capabilities of its armed forces in the past two decades, and they are quickly obtaining parity with their counterparts in the West. China has made great strides along the long road to rebuild its military, so that it can compete and excel in the modern battlespace. China has been written about the fledgling PLAN Aircraft Carrier Program. With one conventional aircraft carrier service, they are learning, and a second carrier being built. China has obviously made the commitment to acquire at least a small aircraft carrier strike capability. Another important development, perhaps less sensational in headline catching the aircraft carriers, is the growth and modernization of the amphibious capabilities of both the PLA and the PLAN. These military strategists reveal that naval power, including naval aviation, can project power and can also provide China with the more subtle yet very effective means of naval power presence in the region. The presence of Chinese naval power in the region can be leveraged to influence advantage in political struggles with its neighbors. Neither naval presence nor naval power and naval air power can take or retake in a whole ground. And thus, China has decided that a modern and capable amphibious force of sufficient size is a necessary component of its overall maritime strategy. It is significant that this force has doubled in size over the past five years and has been equipped with new high-tech weaponry and the beginnings of a viable sea-lift component that can carry it to battle. The beginnings of the Chinese interest in amphibious warfare dates back to the Korean War and the people's Republic of China's efforts to defeat the coming entangue in the 1950s. In 1953, the PLA established the PLA Marine Corps, PLAMC. Although comprising of two brigades of approximately 6000 officers and men, the PLAMC have undergone a continuous transformation since the Taiwan Strait crisis of the 1990s. The force has been equipped with China's most modern and capable small arms and equipment and utilizes the new generation of CBD, O5 and CBD 2000 amphibious assault vehicles. In some ways, modern on the USMC, the PLAMC Marines are highly trained in all forms of modern war fighting. They are considered a vital component of China's rapid reaction forces and are thus highly mobile and kept on a heightened state of readiness. The current force structure of the PLAMC is of two brigades. The first Marine Brigade and the 164th Marine Brigade. Each brigade consists of one armored regiment and two Marine battalions and various support elements. The PLAMC relies on the high speed of its CBD O5 2000 series vehicles to carry them from offshore amphibious platforms such as the Type 071 LPD. The CBD O5 is the world's fastest armored amphibious assault vehicle, capable of a top speed of 45 kph in the water. In addition, PLA Marines are skilled in air assault operations, small boat assaults and underwater diving operations. Although the PLAMC represents the very potent amphibious assault and rapid reaction force, the Chinese political and military leadership realized years ago that the force is too small to respond to multiple threats across the full scope of China's maritime boundaries, nor large enough to mount a successful invasion of Taiwan. A viable power protection capability in the form of amphibious assault and aerosol forces is seen as an essential in protecting the nation's interests in Africa, the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and East China Sea, especially as is confronted by US attempts to contain it. Starting in 2014, the Chinese high command decided to expand the two established amphibious mechanized infantry divisions to four. The first and 86 AMIDs are based in the Nanjing Military Region, and the 123rd and 24th AMIDs are based in the Gangzao Military Region. Each division is comparable to a mechanized infantry division in size and establishment, the expansion of the AMIDs. Gives the PLA a greater amphibious capability than likely required in the near future in deterring regional challenges to Chinese territorial claims in both the South and East China and providing a viable response to violations of its territorial integrity. None of China's potential adversaries in the region other than the United States Navy have a comparable amphibious warfare force. When combined with the PLA-MC, the AMIDs give Chinese diplomacy a very robust practical demonstration of force. Regularly held amphibious exercises showcasing the growing aptitude of these forces only reinforce this reality. Perhaps the most obvious challenges facing the Marines and AMIDs are a major shortcoming that is the process of remedy. It is the lack of heavy sea lift capability to transport these units over long sea voyages and within striking range of the theoretical targets. Beginning in 2006 with the launch of the vessel Kunlin-Chan, China started along the road to modernizing its amphibious assault capabilities. The first vessel of the Type 071-class amphibious transport dock, the Kunlin-Chan, is the first of six vessels that are planned. Four vessels have been launched and commissioned since December 2006. These LPDs are equipped with an air flight deck and hanger to support helicopter operations and a well deck to allow amphibious assaults via AAVs, landing craft, or LCAC hovercraft. The LPD has the inherent flexibility to provide over the horizon air assault and amphibious assault capability. The LPD is the perfect platform to respond to both military incursions into disputed island territories such as the Spratly and Paracelor Islands, as well as a support platform for Chinese island bases in these areas. The PLAN has 15 Type 072-A-class LSTs in service. It is unclear how many total vessels are planned, but it is surmised to the Type 072-A, is meant to replace older Type 072-class LSTs. The vessel has a small flight deck that can accommodate one helicopter and enough under-deck space to store a maximum of 10 MBTs or 500 tons worth of light vehicles in cargo. Approximately 250-300 troops can be accommodated. There are total of 32-072 LSTs of all classes in service with the PLAN. These LSTs are traditional amphibious assault vessels that are loaded via stern ramp on our beach both first during assault. China has made a significant effort to acquire large air cushioned landing craft, both indigenously and from abroad. In 2009, the Chinese government signed a deal with a Ukrainian firm to purchase two Zubiaklas heavy assault hovercraft, and the license to manufacture two more in China. These four hovercraft have been supplemented by an additional four purchased from the Greek Navy. The largest combat hovercraft in the world, the Zubir can carry a 150-ton payload at a range of 300 miles and a speed of 40 knots. The advantage of air cushioned vessels is that they can carry their payloads of troops and vehicles in land from the sea, traveling beyond the beach and deeper inland. Given the significant payload of the Zubir, a maximum of three-type 96 MBTs can be transported quickly to the battlefield and deployed behind enemy lines. China has produced an LCAC similar in design as the U.S. Navy LCAC, but it is smaller and carries a smaller payload. The Type 726 U.E. was designed to be carried in the well deck of the Type 071 LPD, which can accommodate four of these hovercraft. The U.E. can carry a payload of 60 tons at a speed of 60 knots. A number of different concepts and models have been shown to the public that clearly showcased the planned desire to field an LHD in the immediate future. The planned dimensions and specifications of the various designs in vision and LHD are very large displacement at between 36,000 and 40,000 tons displacement. The vessel is much larger than the Royal Australian Navy Canberra class LHD, as well as the Japanese maritime self-defense force Izumo class DTH, each weighing in at approximately 27,000 tons. It is closer in displacement to the U.S. Navy WOSP class LHD, which displaces 41,000 tons. Unless the PLA is determined to operate fixed wing, the star aircraft from the new vessel, as the WOSP class LHD currently does. Such a large size denotes an increased helicopter aerosol capability. A farther beyond contemporary LHD design, or a significant cargo an amphibious assault capacity. China has a growing list of reasons to pursue an expansion of its amphibious warfare capability. Not only does China confront challenges to its perceived territorial integrity from a host of regional neighbors, it is more actively being challenged in the greater geopolitical sense by the United States. The United States is trying to contain an increasingly empowered China. At a time when China's growing global interest and influence are in the ascension, such a combination will undoubtedly lead to political and diplomatic conflict, if not military conflict at some time in the not too distant future. As it backs up, its territorial claims and real terms by developing settlements, military bases and early warning stations on a host of islands, indisputed waters, it must have a viable amphibious warfare deterrent, and the means by which to rest control of any of these assets back from hostile invaders. It is most likely that the United States will continue in its belligerent attempts to contain a perceived adversary, as opposed to realizing the inevitability of the return to a unipolar balance of power in the world. This means continued military brinkmanship in the Asia-Pacific region, and a likely confrontation with China. China has began construction of the first type 075 class-lancing helicopter dog, LHD. Construction most likely started in January or February of this year, with some satellite imagery and digital photos appearing in line of at least one prefabricated house cell. The type 075 will be the largest amphibious warfare vessel in the People's Liberation Army Navy, planned, with similar displacement and dimensions as the US Navy wasp class LHD. The PLA has also made it known that the force plans to expand the current PLA marine corpse from 20,000 personnel to 100,000. Astrana completes preparations for its new military base in Djibouti, located in the strategic Horn of Africa. It has also continued its substantial investment in developing the port of Guadar, Pakistan. Not only will Guadar become a key logistics hub, as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPAC, and the one belt one road trade initiative, but will also be a key naval base in providing security for China's maritime trade in the region. When these developments are viewed in conjunction with the decision to reduce the size of the army by 300,000 personnel, it is obvious that China has reassessed the strategic focus of the nation's armed forces. The plan intends to expand the current force structure of the PLA marine corpse fivefold from two brigades to ten brigades. At the same time, the plan will be increased in sizing capabilities with many new, large displacement warships of various types added to the fleet. Of particular interests are the addition of at least two type 055 destroyers, an indigenously designed and build aircraft carrier of a new class, two more type 071 LPDs, and the first type 075 LHD. China is rapidly gaining the ability to project power and naval presence at increasing distances from its shores. Not only is the plan expanding in Tunnage, but its new vessels are considerably more capable. The plan will be striving to add and train an additional 25% more personnel over the next half a decade in an effort to add the skilled crews, pilots and support personnel that will facilitate such an ambitious expansion. The Chinese military leadership previously decided to double the number of AMIDs starting in 2014. A 100% increase in the PLA AMID and a 500% increase in the PLA MC to know the major strategic ship and the defense strategy of the Chinese state. With the successful growth of the Silk Road economic belt, maritime Silk Road initiative, it becomes readily apparent that China must focus on securing and defending this global economic highway. China has made a massive investment in partnership with many nations in ensuring the success of a massive system of economic arteries that will span half of the globe. Many of these logistic arteries will transits strategic international maritime territories. In light of these developments, a military shift in focus away from fighting a grand war in China to greater maritime presence and power projection capability are quite logical. China began construction of a maritime support facility in Djibouti in 2016 to protect its interests in Africa, facility joined anti-pirusy operations in the region and to provide a naval base to support long range and extended deployments of plan assets to protect the shipping lanes transiting the state of Aden. In addition, China invested approximately 46 billion US dollars in developing the China Pakistan economic corridor, including major investment in the infrastructure of the port of Guadar. The governments of both nations desire the stationing of a flattilla of planned warships in the port and possibly a rapid reaction to the force of PLA Marines. Guadar is well positioned to not only protect China's economic interests in Pakistan, but also to react to any crisis threatening the free passage of maritime traffic through the state of her moves. The forward positioning of naval forces will allow the plan to protect the vital crude oil and natural gas imports transiting the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden and into the Indian Ocean from root west of the Horn of Africa. In light of the fact that 6% of natural gas imports and 34% of crude oil imports by sea to China transit this region, the desire to secure these waterways becomes readily apparent. Not only will the presence of planned warships and Marines help to ensure China's vital interests in Pakistan and the China Pakistan economic corridor in particular, but it would also forward the plan a base of operations close to the state of her moves. Approximately 51% of all Chinese crude oil imports by sea transit the state, as well as 24% of seaborne natural gas imports. Any closure of the state of her moves due to a theoretical military conflict or an active terrorism or piracy would have a huge impact on the Chinese economy. Although the maritime trade routes transiting the Indian Ocean are vital importance to keeping the manufacturing engine of China running and interrupted, the South China Sea is of even greater importance. Not only does the region facilitate the passage of 5 trillion US dollars in global trade annually, but much of this trade is compromised of Chinese energy imports and exports of all categories. The geographic bottleneck of the Strait of Malauka to the southwest of the South China Sea affords the transit of 84% of all water borne crude oil and 30% of natural gas imports to China. The closure of the strait or a significant disruption of maritime traffic in the South China Sea would have a devastating impact on the Chinese state. It is an vital national interest of China to secure the region based on this fact alone. In addition, establishing a series of strategically located Iceland outposts covering the approaches to the South China Sea. A fourth China, a greater ability to secure the entire region, establish anti-axis anti-denial A2AD and defend the southern approaches to the Chinese mainland, while enforcing the nation's claim to valuable energy and renewable resources in the region. China continues to expand and reinforce its island holdings in both the Paracel and Sforthley archipelagos. The massive construction on Mr. Frieve, fiery cross-freeve, and Su Bereve will likely be completed later this year. These three islands, in conjunction with the surveillance stations, port facilities and helicopter bases located on number-key smaller atolls, affords China the capability to project power and presence in the region at a level that no other regional or global power can match. As China moves forward in expanding the PLAMC and the amphibious divisions of the PLA, it has maintained a swift schedule and shipbuilding, which aims to provide a balanced and flexible amphibious sea-lift capability. China intends to tailor a modern and sizable amphibious worker fleet that is capable of defending the growing maritime interests of the nation, and which can provide a significant power projection capability that can be employed across the full breadth of the maritime cell-crowed. The first two classes of amphibious vessels that were seen as essential to design, construct and supply to the PLAMC, were the Type 072A glass landing-shifting LST and the Type 071 class landing platform dog LPD. There are a total of 6 Type 071 LPD's planned with four currently in service and the fifth vessel region completion this year. Plants to build a larger LHD began in 2012 with a number of different designs contemplated. The class was known in intervening years as the Type 075 or Type 081. The Type 075 design was finalized and plans were made to begin construction in 2016. Although many analysts believe that the plan intends to build two such vessels, there will most likely be a need for one or two additional vessels of this class to meet the growing maritime security and power projection requirements of the All signs point to the plans intention of establishing two to three amphibious ready groups, ARGs, as they have slowly and methodically developed a modern amphibious warfare skill set over the past two decades. They have taken a similar approach to establishing a modern carrier-based naval aviation arm. From what is known, the Type 075 will displace 40,000 tons, have an LWA of 250 meters and a beam of 30 meters. The Type 075 will be fitted with a large well deck, allowing for amphibious operations by LCACs, AAVs and conventional land and craft. Each LHD could theoretically carry approximately 1,500 to 2,000 Marines, a full complement of MBTs and AAVs, approximately 25 to 40 armored vehicles, 60 to 80 late vehicles, and ample cargo storage space. The helicopter complement will most likely consist of approximately 20 ZA transfer helicopters, 2Z18FA's W helicopters, 1R2K31AW helicopters, 4Z9 utility helicopters, and possibly 6-8 naval versions of the Z10 attack helicopters. With no VSTOL fixed-wing attack aircraft and service, the plan would most likely opt for using a rotary wing attack element for the LHD. China has been slowly and methodically building the foundations of economic and military security, and is offering those nations that cooperate, as part of the new Silk Road, Maritime Silk Road, a seat at the table. In order to create a mutually beneficial trade and transport network, one that may soon supersede or compete against others, China must secure its vital interests, backed up by military force, and build a viable and sustainable naval presence in key maritime regions. China has clearly signaled that its defense strategies changing. The Chinese leadership feels that the sovereignty of mainland China is secure, and the shifting its focus to securing the vital maritime trade lifeline that not only ensures the security of the nations, but will also allow China to increase its economic prosperity and trade partnership with the multitude of nations. Whether the United States decides to stand in a way of China's growth or chooses to participate more constructively in a mutually beneficial relationship is yet to be determined. Without a doubt, China has set its course and will not deviate from this course unless an overwhelming force is brought to bear. China is on pace to achieve regional naval supremacy, by the year 2025. This has been a long-term goal of the Chinese national and military leadership, the foundations of which were laid out in the early 1990s. Chinese naval supremacy and the absolute necessity of it on at least a regional basis is tied not only to the development and security of the maritime segment of one belt one road, but also access to China's growing presence on the African continent. The modernization and expansion of the People's Liberation Army Navy, PLAN, has been conducted in parallel with the fortification of islands in the South China Sea and the establishment of military bases in and around the strategic horn of Africa and the state of hormones. After centuries of isolationism, internal strife, a devastating cultural revolution, and later an economic boom, China is now on the cusp of global expansion. This will not just be a limited or one-dimensional expansion, but one of economic, military and even cultural dimensions. In contrast to the US leadership of recent decades, the National and Military Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has been diligent and focused on implementing long-term programs. While both the military industrial complex of the US and the authoritarian communist systems of government of these respective nations, both breed rampant corruption, social and economic inequality and a multitude of dysfunctionalities, the Chinese system is inherently more singular in focus as all authoritarian regimes are. While one could reflect on US foreign policy over the past 40 years and determine that it has been quite haphazard, disjointed and even schizophrenic in nature, the opposite must be said of China. This fact becomes readily apparent when contrasting the development and expansion of the PLAN and that of the US Navy. It can rightly be asserted that the US Navy is a force struggling to define its core mission and strategic focus as the year 2020 begins. Since the dissolving of the Soviet Union, the US military industrial complex has encouraged a wasteful bureaucracy and inept an overly confident civilian and military leadership to invest vast sums of money in a growing wish list of high-tech weapons aimed at achieving full spectrum dominance over every possible adversary. Little thought was apparently given to the opportunity cost of investing in such programs and how they would be employed in a broader national defence strategy. The US Navy stands out as the worst example of these failures and is poised at a crossroads today. After the Soviet Union disappeared as its chief adversary on the high seas, the US Navy maintained its age-old obsession with the aircraft carrier and utilized its many aircraft carrier strike groups, ASG, to great effect in attacking any disobedient nation that lacked a robust Navy or air defence system. While the modern ASG proved effective at power projection against weaker adversaries, its viability in a modern maritime environment heavily contested by a peer adversary has yet to be established. The US Navy has decided to ignore this obvious fact and has continued to embrace the ASG as the cornerstone of naval strategic planning well into the future. The US Navy has maintained 10 ASGs and launched the latest generation of aircraft carriers in the form of the Gerald R4 to CVN 78 in 2013. Although commissioned in 2017, the carrier has yet to reach operational readiness and has been plagued by many technical problems with its most essential combat systems. The CVN 78 is the most expensive warship ever constructed with current unit cost approaching $14 billion US dollars. While the US has invested vast sums of money, energy and focus in developing a massive new class of aircraft carrier, it has done very little to improve the one asset most crucial to the carrier, the carrier airwing that it carries into battle. Instead of committing to develop aircraft tailored to specific functions, the Navy chose to embrace the one size fits all concept of the F-18 Super Hornet. In addition, the service also committed to this concept to a much larger degree in throwing its support behind the F-35 joint strike fighter. Neither the F-18 nor the F-35 rectified a combat range now inherent in the aircraft carrier airwing. In short, an ASG will become a target of both land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles, ASBM, and even land-based Chinese aircraft equipped with anti-ship guided missiles long before the ASG can achieve striking distance with its carrier-borne aircraft. This problem becomes even more glaring when one considers the scenario of a Chinese battle group forward-deployed and operating within range of its own land-based anti-air warfare assets. What has the US Navy done to modernize and improve its surface warfare vessels over the past two decades? Not surprisingly, the service embraced new ship designs that were long on high-tech promise, yet did not fit into a specific traditional and vital function within the broader strategic framework of the service. The littoral combat ship LCS program and some vaults DDG-1000 programs were ill-conceived at the outset and resulted in two classes of vessels that consumed vast amounts of funding, time, and energy that could have been used to improve upon traditional proven warship designs. At an approximate unit cost of $350 million US dollars per LCS and $8 billion per DDG-1000, both vessels have proven long and cost and short on capability. The Arleigh Burke class DDG is arguably the backbone of the US Navy and is a highly effective and proven warship. The latest upgrade to the design, the Flight 3, will not begin production until sometime between 2023 and 2029. A multipurpose frigate vessel program known as the FFG-X meant to pick up where the LCS failed has yet to reach an advanced design phase. There are currently five contenders for the new FFG-X proposal. At the same time, there is no replacement at all planned for the aging Ticonderoga CG-47 class cruiser. The Ticonderoga class CG's perform a vital AAW and surface warfare function in the established US Navy carrier strike group structure. The only other Navy in the world fielding a similar warship is China's with the introduction the first Type-O55 class in 2018. While the United States Navy struggles to identify its purpose and maintain its pre-eminence in the 21st century, the PLAN has embarked on a robust program of modernization and expansion based on sound strategic principles and proven technology. China has produced a long list of modern, capable classes of warships in recent years. Not only has the PLAN designed, constructed and put a new generation of warships into operational service in the past two decades. It has engaged in an ambitious shipbuilding program that has seen these vessels fielded at an unprecedented rate. Standardized designs for Corvette, guided missile frigate FFG, guided missile destroyer DDG, large guided missile destroyer cruiser CG, landing platform DOC LPD, landing helicopter DOC LHD and logistical support vessels of multiple classes have all been adopted and fielded in significant numbers in the past 20 years. Running in parallel to this, the PLAN has also developed a fledgling aircraft carrier program, including the 100% indigenous Type-001A Shandong, such a feat is unparalleled in modern naval history. The question must immediately be asked, why would a nation engage in such an ambitious program to transform and expand its naval war fighting capabilities in such totality? The answer is obvious. It intends to use this capability, but in what fashion and to what end? In order for the Chinese nation to complete and secure the ambitious one belt one road economic trade corridor, and to ensure the economic prosperity of the country into the next century, a sizeable navy of unparalleled capability will be required. Such a naval force is currently in an advanced state of completion, yet a further five years are likely required before the PLAN will be in a position to fight and win against a determined US naval effort to confront it through force of arms. If current production levels are maintained, the PLAN will field an impressive force of major surface warfare and phobias warfare and aircraft carriers by 2025. By this time major surface warfare combatants will include 50 times Type-056 Corvettes, 30 times Type-054A frigates, 18 times Type-052D destroyers, and 8 or more Type-055 destroyers. The amphibious warfare fleet will be comprised of approximately 38 times LSTs, 8 times Type-071LPDs, and at least 2 times Type-075 LHDs. The Type-001 Yao Ning and Type-001A Shandong will both be operational, while the first of the much more capable Type-002 Catobac carriers will likely have reached operational status as well. These warships will be supported by no less than 11 logistics support and underway replenishment vessels and four garrison support vessels of modern design. A major strategic advantage that China has achieved over the United States is that it has built the most robust and productive shipbuilding industry in the world. China has been ranked as the world's top shipbuilder for five years now, the United States by contrast ranks 10th. The gross tonniture vessels of all types produced in Chinese shipyards, however, is 77 times greater than the total produced by US shipyards. It is important to view the development of both navies within the larger context of the respective geopolitical strategic positions of both countries. China undoubtedly enjoys a stronger position today than it did a decade ago, while the opposite must be said for the United States. Not only has China gained greater political and economic influence on a global scale, but it has moved to secure military supremacy in all areas along its national borders, and increasingly within its expanding maritime territory. By contrast, the United States has lost both political and economic influence in many regions of the world largely through its own failed policies. China has managed to develop greater economic ties with nations that have decided to participate in the One Belt One Road project, which has also afforded them a greater political influence over these nations. China has negotiated the establishment of military bases, mostly logistical support facilities for its growing navy, which will also allow for the deployment of rapid reaction forces to deter and interdict threats to the One Belt One Road trade corridor. China continues to solidify its presence on the African continent. The military base established in Gibraltar and Fleet Support Agreements established in Guadalpacistan and the African nation of Tanzania provide the resources needed to be able to exert military force, if required, to back out Chinese economic and political efforts on the continent. Although the US maintains numerous military bases and facilities in Africa to secure its own strategic interests in the region, it lacks the same political and economic influence that China has established. The US military has been aiding a number of nations in Africa to battle Islamic extremist insurgents, but has made little investment in those nations in a broader sense, and thus exerts far less influence. Although outside of the maritime sphere of influence of China, the nations of Europe have increasingly responded favorably to the promised benefits of the One Belt One Road trade project. On a political and military level, China has largely remained out of European affairs. The same cannot be said for the United States. While the Obama administration began the disastrous multi-faceted war against the Russian Federation, the Trump administration has only expanded it, while antagonizing its most traditional European allies in the process. The Trump administration appears to have doubled down on the failed Ukraine policies of its predecessor, increased US military presence on the European continent, and has leveled trade tariffs on key allies. By propping up the phony Russian threat narrative with increased military deployments, the United States is squandering fast sums of money, and diverting large contingents of frontline fighting forces to confront an enemy it knows to be a threat conceived through its own propaganda alone. China has responded to the US-led effort to internationally isolate Russia by leveraging its position to provide an alternate market for Russian goods. It has supplied political support for Russia on the world stage and has increased military cooperation with Russia in key regions where both nations share an interest and a force to confront the United States. Both nations have increased bilateral cooperation in developing the Northern Arctic shipping route and have conducted joint naval exercises in the maritime regions of Europe, Asia and the Indian Ocean. Iran most recently joined the two and joined exercises in the Indian Ocean. A scenario where the PLAN and US Navy engage in open conflict is improbable at present, yet not impossible. Although China has strengthened its position to such a degree in the South China Sea that no other nation including the United States can change the strategic realities that exist there today, increasing interaction between PLAN and US warships may lead to a tragic encounter. US freedom of navigation patrols are largely symbolic in nature and do not present any real threat to Chinese interests in the region yet they do require a response. Such a situation could lead to a confrontation where an accident occurs or an overzealous vessel commander makes a decision that leads to a military engagement which could escalate in a very short window of time. It is most probable that China will do everything possible to avoid such a situation at present. This may not be the case after 2025 when the PLAN enjoys a much stronger position relative to the US Navy and its allies in the Asia Pacific. China will occupy the central position, enjoy regional guided ballistic missile supremacy and be able to take advantage of land-based air assets in support of its Navy. Surveillance and early warning facilities established on various artificial islands and their tolls will by then be fully operational. If the fire was exchanged between a US warship and PLAN warship in the South China Sea and the incident was not immediately de-escalated, the US vessel would inevitably be destroyed. The PLAN would suffer significant casualties in the exchange without doubt. China would immediately move to deny all access to the region through its already robust anti-access area denial, A2AD capabilities. The United States would then have to decide what level of sacrifice would be acceptable to the state and the American public in rapidly deciding upon its level of military response. The authoritarian Chinese state would find this decision much easier to make. The US 7th fleet would be hard pressed to mount any immediate military response beyond mounting a retaliatory attack by air-attack submarines forward deployed in the region. Any large effort mounted to attack Chinese island garrisons in either the SPACLE or Parasel islands would be met with overwhelming force by a combination of anti-ship guided ballistic missiles, submarine surface and air-attack. It's hard to see any such scenario taking place without the confrontation elevating to a full spectrum war of global proportions. Most regional allies of the United States would calculate that such an outcome would render overwhelmingly negative results and would not outweigh the tragic loss of one or two US warships and their crews. Assuming that a hot war could be avoided, a new Cold War would inevitably result between an ascendant China and a US inter-cline. If current military, economic and political trends continue from the present through 2025, China will only strengthen its strategic position both regionally and globally, while the opposite will likely be the case for the United States. It's important to note that the leadership of both nations see such a conflict as undesirable and not inevitable, yet miscalculations, mistakes and poor judgment can scuttle any grand plans. History is unequivocal in this regard and must be analysed and understood to avoid repeating disaster. We ignore the lessons of history at our peril, yet a current period, bereft of insightful, measured and reasonable leadership in Washington, does not bode well for avoiding what may prove to be an unavoidable conflict between two global superpowers. Although combat aircraft such as the J-31 stealth fighter and J-15 aircraft carrier strike aircraft have made most of the headlines, China has made significant accomplishments in the realm of military transport, a long-range maritime patrol and carrier-borne AEW and C aircraft over the past year. First operational in 2016, the Y-20 military transport is now the largest such aircraft in production in the world. Roughly the size of the Boeing C-17 a globe master, the Y-20 is a crucial component in China's growing ability to expand its strategic power projection capabilities. After initially expressing a need for 400 of these aircraft, the aviation industry cooperation of China, AVIC, later stated that this number was revised to 1000. AVIC began production of the AJ-600 C-plane in July of 2016. The AJ-600 is a large flying boat, capable of landing and taking off on water or on land-based air strips as it has a conventional, retractable atricycle landing gear. It is similar in size to a Boeing 737 or Airbus 320 airline, and the largest C-plane currently in production anywhere in the world. The stated role of the aircraft is search and rescue, firefighting and humanitarian relief. However, it may also be slated to supplement the hub in SH5 and long-range anti-submarine warfare, ASW patrols and aerial reconnaissance. The large-scale production of the Y-20 is a significant achievement of China's state-owned aviation industry and forecasts China's growing desire for robust strategic air lift capability. Not only can the Y-20 transport a large amount of cargo or troops over a great distance, but it can even transport main battle tanks and other armored vehicles. With a maximum payload weight of 73 short tons, the Y-20 can transport the PLA's most modern Type 99A or Type 96 MBTs and any IFVs and APCs now in service. The aircraft has a maximum range exceeding 10,000 km or 6,200 miles and can carry a reduced payload of 40 short tons a range of 7,800 km, 4,850 miles. Range with a maximum payload of 73 short tons is approximately 4,500 km or 2,800 miles. Very similar in design, dimensions and appearance to the Boeing C-17 Glowmaster and a Yushin IL-76. The Y-20 was built to fill the roles of strategic air lift, a paratroop support, and heavy air drop missions. It is slightly larger than the IL-76, yet smaller than a C-17. With the C-17 no longer being produced by Boeing having halted production in 2015, the Y-20 is now the largest military transport aircraft currently in production. As China makes a concerted effort to secure its strategic interest both a close to home and as far away as the Horn of Africa, a viable strategic air lift capability is seen as essential. With a reported a short takeoff ability of 700 meters, the Y-20 can supply troops and supplies to any of China's island outposts in the South China Sea that have an airstrip, such as Woody Island, fire across reef, a mischief reef or subi reef. Any military operations in response to territorial incursions on the part of other claimants to dispute the territories in the region that required invading and occupying land would greatly depend on sufficient strategic air lift supports. The tensions between China and the Philippines significantly lessened with the new Duterte administration and port your relations with Malaysia and Brunei, the likelihood of such a scenario has greatly reduced since last summer. The aircraft can also greatly aid the PLA in maintaining the new military base at the Dolele at G-Booty. The new military base is located just eight miles from Camp Alemonia, the largest US military facility on the continent of Africa, and will serve as logistics base capable of supporting Chinese maritime interests in the Indian ocean, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The Japanese sub-defense forces also operate a small logistics support center adjacent to Camp Alemonia and will apparently be expanding this facility in response to the Chinese project. The question of Taiwan and any further attempt to retake it by force of arms would require a massive amphibious and air-lifter commitment. China lacks both at present but as South Front has diligently documented recently the PLA and plan have greatly expanded and modernized their amphibious warfare capabilities. Any invasion of Taiwan would require not only a sizable amphibious armada but a substantial strategic airlift effort. The acquisition of up to a thousand Y-20s goes a long way towards building a nucleus of such a force. The development of the AG-600 maritime aircraft is a case study that clearly confirms the growth of Chinese aviation industry. Developed by AVIC as an amphibious aircraft meant to serve as a host of civilian and military duties although AVIC is downplaying an in-military role for the plane with design and built in roughly two years. The Harbin-SH5 which the AG-600 will replace took a fledgling Chinese aviation industry nearly 15 years to design and produce and only since production run yielding six aircraft was the result. AVIC has received orders for 17 aircraft so far or for the domestic markets although the aircraft can accommodate 50 passengers no commercial airlines have expressed interest in the design so far. It is more likely that the AG-600 will be utilized by the plan as a long-range maritime patrol aircraft. With much in common with the Shin Maya US-2C plane utilized by the Japanese maritime self-defense forces JMSDF the AG-600 will fill a similar role in the plan. The US-2 currently operates as an air-sea rescue SAR a maritime patrol surveillance aircraft. It is also quite likely that the AG-600 will be further developed into an anti-submarine ASW patrol aircraft like its predecessor the Harbin-SH5. As China's strengthens its position in the South China Sea and continues to develop the defence infrastructure on a number of man-made islands, a long-range SAI aircraft will be a great asset than supportive plan and PLAAF air patrols operating from these islands. The AG-600 is equipped with a tractable landing gear and can operate from an airfield as well as from water. The reported maximum range of the AG-600 is approximately 4500 kilometers or 2800 miles. After decades of investing in its indigenous aviation industry one with humble beginnings and learning as much as possible from both Russian and US aircraft design the nation has achieved the ability to develop a real strategic airlift capability. Although still reliant on Russian aircraft engine production due to the large degree of its most modern aircraft Chinese analogues of many other Russian designs have definitely afforded the Chinese aviation industry greater independence. The maturity of this industry in just the last decade has impressed its peers in both Russia and various Western nations. The resources and funding allocated to acquiring strategic airlift on the level expressed in official government press briefings and reported by state-run media in China all communicates an obvious desire to expand the ability to both project power and respond strategically to challenges to Chinese national interests on a global scale. China is rapidly breaking free from its regional power status and will continue to gain greater influence in global economic, political and military spheres. China may communicate its peaceful intention through diplomatic channels however it is sending a quite different message in real terms as it continues to develop and fortify its position in the South China Sea and the Horn of Africa. China is wisely seeking to protect the vital trade lanes that are its very lifeblood. Economic benefit from this trade has enriched the nation and helped to bring an art of an era of stagnation and subjugation to outside interests. China is once again rising to a level of global influence and importance that has enjoyed for the overwhelming majority of its more than 5,000 years of history. It is crucial to note that over the vast majority of that same history, China has largely adopted a strategically defensive military posture, very rarely engaging in military campaigns of expansion against its neighbors. By further solidifying its position in the South China Sea, China is wisely occupying the central position as part of a larger defensive strategy to protect the vital trade lanes and resources that will ensure its continued prosperity. The one thing is clear, China is developing the military means to defend its position as a world power and to send in their clear message to its peers that it would no longer subordinate its own national interests to those of others regardless of their global power status. A viable aircraft carrier forced in a large strategic air lift capability sent a clear message to the United States in Japan. The China is determined and quite capable of securing and defending its national interests on a global scale. This increasingly assertive posture and need not lead to military conflict, however, an even more assertive United States has already bristled at the possibility of relinquishing any amount of control over what it sees as its sole global sphere of influence. People's Liberation Army Navy officials acknowledge the existence of the first indigenously built aircraft carrier for the PLAN on December 31, 2015. The carrier is based on the same Soviet era template as the Leia Ning, currently in service. The Leia Ning was a development of the admiral Kutnysov class carrier Voryag, purchased from Ukraine in 1998 and totally refitted in the Daliian shipyards. The Leia Ning was commissioned on September 25, 2012 after extensive sea trials and has been in service with the PLAN in the role of a training platform by which the Chinese Navy aims to learn and perfect the complex process of aircraft carrier operations. Known as carrier 16, the Leia Ning is a conventional aircraft carrier that utilizes a skip ramp to launch aircraft. This design limits the size and weight of the aircraft that can be employed, a major limitation overcome by the steam catapults of larger aircraft carriers and the new electromagnetic catapults in use on the new USS Gerald Ford class, now entering sea trials. The relatively small size of the Leia Ning further limits the number of aircraft that can be carried, serviced and stowed on board. A total of 24 J-15 fighters, 6 Z-18 anti-submarine warfare helicopters and 4 K-A-31 early warning helicopters and 2 Harbin Z-9 rescue helicopters are carried on board. The J-15 fighters are naval version of the J-11B which is based on the Russian SU-33 and can only be launched via the skip ramp with a reduced weapons payload of approximately 2,000 pounds with a maximum fuel load. Thus, the J-15 can only be utilized from the Leia Ning with either a reduced range or reduced weapons payload. The aircraft is limited in both interceptor and strike rolls due to the inherent limitations of the skip jump design. Chinese naval planners are already a work to rectify the shortcomings of the Leia Ning on the following vessels. Carrier 17, which is being constructed and carrier 18, which is already in the planning stages. Carrier 17 is being designed with greater underdecked hangar space, possibly denoting a higher complement of aircraft, and it is surmised that carrier 18 will be equipped with steam catapults to overcome the limitations inherent in the skip jump design. Military analysts speculate that the PLAN will build and operate at least three aircraft carriers. This will allow for one vessel to be an operational service, while one is engaged in training operations and one is undergoing maintenance at any given time. China has wisely utilized the Leia Ning as a training platform for which to learn and perfect its aircraft carrier operations and to learn what is most desirable in any future aircraft carrier design as it is becoming more obvious that the first three vessels are just the beginning of a more ambitious program. The largest unknown concerning the PLAN's current aircraft carrier program is how they intend to use these costly and complex vessels operationally. The vessels lack a large and powerful strike aircraft component and have a limited range due to their conventional propulsion. Consequently, the carriers would have to remain within the range of land-based ASW and early warning and surveillance aircraft, such as the T-U-154 and Y-8 AWACs, because they lack their own fixed wing ASW and EWA-CSS-EDs and would require underway replenishment from a fleet-based supply vessel and fuel replenishment ship. It would appear that the new Type 901 fleet supply vessel, currently under construction in the southern Guangdong province, is meant to service the fledgling carrier battle group. Details are sketchy, but the two vessels planned are estimated to be between 40,000 and 45,000 tons displacement. Twice the displacement of the Type 903A fleet tankers, currently undergoing sea trials. Possible future strategic uses of a PLAN carrier battle group include deployment in the South China Sea to effectively increase China air control access to now capabilities. Potential regional adversaries such as Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines would have to alter their strategic calculus to account for the added threat of a Chinese carrier battle group in the region when considering any future warfare scenarios. The armed forces of Taiwan have taken notice of the threat and conducted war games recently that involve the addition of a PLAN CBG in a hypothetical invasion of the island nation. It is most likely that the first three aircraft carriers are just a developmental stepping stone to a much more flexible, capable and powerful class of aircraft carrier. If it is one thing that the PLAN has shown in recent decades, it is committed and capable of developing and fielding modern complex warships and weapon systems in its quest to stand on a level playing field with any potential adversary, chief amongst them, the United States.