Titanic Sub Hoax Freemason 33

Video Transcript:

Ocean gate shouldn't have been doing what it was doing. I think that's pretty clear. I wish I had been more vocal about that, but I think I was unaware that they weren't certified. Because I wasn't really studying it. I wasn't really interested. Stockton Rush asked me if I wanted to go out there and dive this season. I wasn't interested. There was a lot of concern about this outfit and this sub. A lot of concern, even to the extent that I wasn't involved in it, because I was making an avatar too at the time, but a lot of them got together and wrote a letter to Ocean gate and said you have to certify. You cannot take people down. It's irresponsible. And it could lead to catastrophe. Monday morning, when I first found out about the incident, got on a whole bunch of calls and emails. It's a small community within an hour and a half. I had the following information. They were on descent. They were at 3,500 feet. They lost columns and tracking. The last one being the critical one because the transponder that's used to track a sub during descent on the bottom is a fully autonomous system. It's in its own pressure housing and it has its own battery power. So for them to lose columns and tracking at the same time, sub was gone. There was no question in my mind. For days, I tried to run other scenarios that could account for it. I could come up with nothing. So the next thing I did was contacted a few more people and managed to track down, you know, their acoustic networks around summer research, summer, summer intelligence. We got confirmation within an hour that there had been a loud bang at the same time that the sub was that's columns were lost. A loud bang on the headphones, loss of transducer or transponder, loss of columns. I knew what happened. Sub imploded. I sent emails to everybody. I know I said we've lost some friends. The sub is imploded. It's on the bottom in pieces right now. I sent that out Monday morning. I never believed in that technology of wound carbon fiber, you know, wound filament, cylinder, cahol. I thought it was a horrible idea. I wish I'd spoken up, you know, but I assumed somebody was smarter than me, you know, because I never experimented with that technology, but it just sounded bad on its face. Because we make pressure holes out of contiguous material, steel, titanium, ceramic, acrylic. And so you can model it. You can do finite element analysis of it. And, you know, you understand the yield properties. You understand the number of cycles that it can take. But you can't do that with a composite material because it's two to similar materials, you know, sort of bonded together. And so we all knew that the danger was delamination and progressive failure over time with microscopic water ingress and fatigue, what they call cycling fatigue. And we knew that if the subpass, it's pressure test, it wasn't going to fail on the first dive. It might fail on dive seven. All right. I don't know what they're at, you know, but it's going to fail over time, which is insidious. You don't get that with steel with titanium. Now there's one wreck line next to the other wreck for the same damn reason.